H1N1 Challenges Ahead by unknown
 In June 2009 the World Health Organization (WHO) raised the pandemic flu alert to six, the
highest level, which indicates a global pandemic is underway. This is the world’s first in-
fluenza pandemic since 1968.2
 H1N1 has spread to all states and D.C., hospitalizing almost 10,000 people and killing close
to 600 people as of September 2009.  
 Twenty-six states were reporting widespread influenza activity as of September 19, includ-
ing:  Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and
Washington.  Any reports of widespread influenza activity in September are very unusual.
Monitoring has shown that the virus remains virtually identical to initial outbreaks and it has






ALTHOUGH WE WERE FORTUNATE NOT TO SEE A MORE SERIOUS SITUATION
IN THE SPRING WHEN WE FIRST GOT NEWS OF THIS OUTBREAK... THE POTENTIAL
FOR A SIGNIFICANT [H1N1] OUTBREAK IN THE FALL IS LOOMING.  WE WANT TO
MAKE SURE THAT WE ARE NOT PROMOTING PANIC, BUT WE ARE PROMOTING
VIGILANCE AND PREPARATION.




As the United States gets ready for an increase in H1N1 flu virus activity thisfall, there are a number of challenges the country faces.
Federal, state, and local governments, health care
providers, businesses, schools, and communities
around the country are taking extraordinary meas-
ures to respond to the second wave of H1N1, when
a significant percentage of Americans could be-
come sick from the H1N1 virus.  According to a
planning scenario developed by the President’s
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology
(PCAST), if 30 percent of the U.S. population con-
tracted H1N1, it could mean around 90 million
Americans could get ill, 1.8 million could need to
be hospitalized, and around 30,000 could die.5
The country is much better prepared to face a
pandemic than it was just a few short years ago.
The investments that have been made to im-
prove pandemic preparedness have resulted in
significantly enhancing the country’s ability to
respond to an influenza pandemic.  These in-
vestments have increased the country’s vaccine
manufacturing capacity, provided helpful aware-
ness and education campaigns, contributed to a
more robust federal stockpile of antiviral med-
ications, improved many core facets of the na-
tion’s public health system, and assisted in the
development of federal, state, local, community,
business, and school pandemic plans.  Since
2005, a strong National Strategy for Pandemic In-
fluenza has been developed, and every state has
a pandemic plan, which are constantly being re-
vised and refined.
However, there were also many concerns that
were identified, but were not adequately ad-
dressed or funded in prior planning efforts.
Some very large underlying issues, including how
to manage surge capacity during a mass event, de-
veloping a reimbursement system for uncompen-
sated care during an emergency, and the need to
modernize and strengthen, in a sustained way,
much of the public health infrastructure, are still
major challenges. In addition, before this year,
policies called for many preparedness functions
to be state and local responsibilities and did not
provide federal support for these needs, includ-
ing vaccine distribution and the expectation that
states should purchase a significant portion of an-
tiviral medications to protect their own citizens.
Since the emergence of H1N1 this spring, officials
have been racing against the clock to address many
of the remaining issues.  Congress appropriated
$1.9 billion in emergency supplemental funding
and an additional $5.8 billion in contingency fund-
ing, some of which has already been tapped by the
Obama Administration, to enhance vaccine pro-
duction, help bolster state and local health de-
partment capacity, upgrade surveillance
capabilities, and meet other needs.  In the last few
months, $1.4 billion has been drawn from the
available funds to assist states in their pandemic re-
sponse and vaccination implementation programs.
This fall and winter, federal, state, and local health
departments will undertake the most ambitious
vaccination plan in U.S. history, by making the
H1N1 vaccine available to all Americans and par-
ticularly targeting high-risk groups as soon as it is
ready.  The U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) has approved vaccines for H1N1 and a vac-
cine distribution policy was created in so far as the
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) has set up a system to process orders and
deliver vaccine when it is available to locations
identified by each state.  HHS has also worked
with health departments, hospitals, and other
providers to rapidly improve surveillance capabil-
ities to be able to track and monitor the spread of
the virus.  Federal, state, and local officials have
been also working hard to educate the public
about H1N1 issues and ways to best prepare for
and protect themselves during the outbreak.
But many challenges still remain:
 Vaccine Issues: One major challenge the
country faces is that only a limited amount of
the vaccine will be available by October, when
the flu is expected to become more wide-
spread.  Communities and health care systems
will therefore have to prepare for how to man-
age until a vaccine is widely available, by an-
ticipating high levels of needed care and
finding ways to limit the spread of disease by
encouraging people to practice good hygiene
habits and for those who are sick to limit con-
tact with others.  Communities will have to
plan how to reach high-risk groups early,
when supplies are low, and the rest of the pop-
ulation as more vaccine becomes available.
Since the vaccine may not be made widely
available until later in the outbreak, it may
deter many individuals from seeking out the
vaccine, since they may feel the risk has di-
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minished.  However, experts recommend
everyone still get vaccinated because a third
wave of the disease could emerge next year.
Once a vaccine is available, an additional
challenge will be to get it to young adults,
who are considered to be at particularly high-
risk for contracting H1N1, and to minority
populations, who have high rates of underly-
ing health conditions which make them
more vulnerable to H1N1.  Historically, low
levels of young adults and minority commu-
nities receive seasonal flu vaccinations.
 Competing Seasonal Flu: Another challenge
is that the seasonal flu will also be circulating
at the same time as H1N1.  Typically, the sea-
sonal flu sickens between five and 20 percent
of the U.S. population, leads to an average of
more than 200,000 hospitalizations, and re-
sults in about 36,000 deaths from flu-related
causes.6 This may create added confusion
around who has which kind of flu and put in-
creased strain on the health system.  There
are some reports that H1N1 could be “crowd-
ing out” the regular seasonal flu and may re-
sult in reducing cases of the seasonal flu.
 Strain on Medical System: Surge capacity,
which is the ability of the medical system to
care for a massive influx of additional patients,
is one of the most serious remaining chal-
lenges for emergency health preparedness.
Health care providers and hospitals could be
quickly overrun or overextended during the
H1N1 outbreak, even though it is currently a
mild strain of flu, and the plans and capacities
to deal with this influx are limited.  Federal,
state, local, and health system officials will have
to continue to clearly communicate with the
public as to which groups are urged to seek
rapid care and who should practice sound self-
care measures and stay home when ill.
 Eroding Public Health Infrastructure: One of
the biggest ongoing challenges health officials
face is that preparations are taking place in the
context of a public health system that has been
chronically underfunded for decades.  Many
core systems and capabilities are lagging be-
hind where they should be or could be, which
leaves the nation unnecessarily vulnerable dur-
ing times of emergency.  The concurrence of
lost workforce due to the economic recession,
the continuing need to address other pressing
public health issues simultaneously with a pan-
demic, and the diversion of health department
employees to the H1N1 response have placed
a severe strain on the public health system. 
This report examines the series of challenges the
country faces in preparing to deal with the com-
plications that an H1N1 outbreak adds to this flu
season related to medical care capacity, antiviral
medications, disease surveillance, vaccinations,
budget cuts at public health departments, and
caring for people in communities, particularly
meeting the special needs of at-risk populations,
and provides a series of recommendations for
how to address preparedness gaps.
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Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response: 2009 HHS Funds for H1N1
(dollars in millions)
HHS Original Contingent Total Funds
Appropriations Release*
Vaccine Production and Ancillary Supplies Includes bulk vaccine antigen and 1,117 2,485 3,602adjuvant manufacturing, fill finish, and syringes and needles
Ongoing Pandemic Influenza Activities with H1N1 Impacts 
Includes manufacturer retrofits, clinical trials, antiviral procurements, diagnostic test 179 232 411
development, and PPE
Vaccination Campaign Planning and Implementation:  Upgrading State and 350 -- 350Local Capacity Includes Cooperative Agreements for Hospitals and State/Locals
Vaccination Campaign Planning and Implementation:  Vaccine Distribution 30 213 243Distribution of vaccines and ancillary supplies to receiving sites within the States
Vaccination Campaign Planning and Implementation:  State and Local 
Vaccine Implementation/Administration Includes funding to plan and execute a -- 1,094 1,094
mass vaccination campaign through the Public Health Emergency Response Grants
Vaccination Campaign Planning and Implementation:  CDC Vaccination -- 112 112Campaign Activities Includes vaccination monitoring and communications
Federal, State and Int’l Surveillance & Preparedness – CDC 170 154 324
Compensation, ASPR, and FDA 4 11 15
Total 1,850 4,300 6,150
*A total of $5.8 billion in contingency funds are available at the Administration’s discretion.  These numbers represent
the latest release of funds as of press time.  
I.  PREPARING FOR SURGE IN MEDICAL CARE
With limited vaccine expected to be available at
the start of the outbreak and significant numbers
of Americans becoming ill, the health care system
could be quickly overwhelmed by a major influx
of patients seeking medical care.  Health depart-
ments, health care providers, and hospitals are
preparing for how to manage a surge of poten-
tial patients.  Patients could rapidly fill existing
hospital beds and cause a surge in demand for
critical medicines and equipment, such as antivi-
ral medications, ventilators, and protective masks.
During a major emergency like a pandemic out-
break, the health care system could be signifi-
cantly stretched beyond normal capabilities.
Figuring out how to plan for a massive influx of
patients is one of the hardest parts of preparing
for health emergencies, and it has yet to be ad-
equately dealt with. “Surge capacity” manage-
ment is one of our biggest public health
emergency preparedness weaknesses.  Many of
the surge capacity problems have been identi-
fied -- including having enough supplies, staff,
and space to treat patients -- but solutions to
these problems are often lacking.
A.  AMBULATORY CARE AND EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS 
In the spring, doctors’ offices and hospitals were
overrun by patients who had the flu or were con-
cerned they had the flu.  During disasters, health
providers have to adapt their regular practices to
treat a large number of patients very quickly.  In
an effort to manage the number of patients seek-
ing care, the government is working with physi-
cians in states and local communities to develop
telephone hotlines and interactive websites to
prevent patients with less severe symptoms from
going to the hospital.7 The U.S. Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention (CDC) has provided
information and guidance to states and health fa-
cilities on how to set up the call centers, based on
models similar to poison control centers.
Surge capacity issues are particularly acute in
emergency rooms, where in the best of times,
they already face capacity shortages and staffing
issues.  For instance in New York City, one of the
places hardest hit by the spring wave of H1N1,
hospital and city health officials reported that
44,678 people visited emergency rooms in with
flu-like symptoms from May 15 to June 15, com-
pared to just 4,267 the previous year.8
With more than 15 percent of Americans lack-
ing health insurance coverage, the financial im-
pact on the country’s public health and health
care systems could be disastrous if hospitals, com-
munity health centers, and primary care facili-
ties treat large numbers of uninsured.9 Young
adults between 19 and 29 years old are consid-
ered to be at high-risk for developing more se-
vere cases of H1N1, and they represent one of
the largest and fastest growing segments of the
population without health insurance.10 In addi-
tion, individuals without insurance often end up
going to the emergency room when they need
medical care, which results in higher cost care.  
Some experts have recommended an emer-
gency health benefit be enacted to ensure care
for all Americans during emergencies and to en-
sure that health care providers receive compen-
sation.  Other experts have suggested that
Medicaid, Medicare, and private insurers should
extend out-of-network benefits during times of
emergencies, like a pandemic, so that patients
have access to a wider community of doctors and
so that hospitals and other facilities can more
easily seek compensation if they provide care for
out-of-network patients.  Expedited enrollment
for Medicaid can also be deployed in a crisis, as
it was after the September 11th tragedy.
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B.  HOSPITAL BED CAPACITY
Emergency care centers and doctors’ offices are
expected to see an influx of patients during the
initial phase of the outbreak.  But as the pan-
demic progresses, there will likely be growing
need to hospitalize large number of patients
who will be in need of more significant care.
This becomes even more of an imperative
should the severity of the pandemic increase.
In order to illustrate the number of people who
could become hospitalized and the capacity of
hospitals to meet the potential influx of patients,
Trust for America’s Health (TFAH) used CDC’s
FluSurge modeling program to estimate the
number of hospitalizations that could occur per
state and how quickly this would fill the number
of available hospital beds in that state.
The estimates are based on expert predictions
that the H1N1 virus is a relatively mild strain of
flu, similar to the severity of the 1968 pandemic
flu outbreak, and that up to 35 percent of Amer-
icans could potentially become sick with H1N1.
Based on these assumptions, the number of peo-
ple who might need to be hospitalized could
range from a high of 168,025 in California to a
low of 2,485 in Wyoming.
Models for a pandemic outbreak anticipate the
pandemic to last for at least eight weeks, reach-
ing its peak at five weeks. Based on the FluSurge
estimates, 15 states would exceed their current
available hospital bed capacity during the fifth
week of the outbreak.  In addition, 22 states
would reach or exceed 80 percent of their hos-
pital bed capacity and 26 states would exceed 75
percent of their hospital bed capacity.
North Dakota (32 percent), Mississippi (35 per-
cent), and South Dakota (37 percent) would
have the highest amount of available bed ca-
pacity at peak of the pandemic during week five.
Delaware (203 percent) and Connecticut (148
percent) would have the highest overload rates.
These estimates do not take into account Army
mobile hospitals or other emergency mobile
hospital bed capacity.  It is also important to
note that the H1N1 pandemic appears to follow
a slightly different pattern.  Instead of an eight-
week wave with the peak of the pandemic oc-
curring during the fifth week, H1N1 appears to
have a much earlier, rapid onset reaching its
peak at week two or three.  Therefore, hospitals
and health care providers need to be prepared
for a crush of patients as soon as H1N1 becomes
widespread in their communities.
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6Potential Pandemic Influenza Cases, Hospitalizations and Bed Capacity 
From a 35 Percent Attack Rate Pandemic Flu*
State Cases Hospital Admissions Bed Capacity at Week 5
Alabama 1,631,665 22,525 55%
Alaska 240,203 2,848 58%
Arizona 2,275,063 29,363 117%
Arkansas 999,387 13,839 50%
California 12,864,833 168,025 125%
Colorado 1,728,810 21,927 88%
Connecticut 1,225,438 17,305 148%
Delaware 305,582 4,197 203%
D.C. 207,142 2,904 47%
Florida 6,414,919 95,064 80%
Georgia 3,390,010 42,348 78%
Hawaii 450,869 6,410 143%
Idaho 533,336 6,803 66%
Illinois 4,515,547 60,934 73%
Indiana 2,231,877 30,234 57%
Iowa 1,050,894 14,951 51%
Kansas 980,747 13,331 43%
Kentucky 1,494,236 20,475 52%
Louisiana 1,543,779 20,381 48%
Maine 460,760 6,762 83%
Maryland 1,971,759 26,691 143%
Massachusetts 2,274,288 31,942 110%
Michigan 3,501,198 48,584 79%
Minnesota 1,827,138 24,768 68%
Mississippi 1,028,516 13,810 35%
Missouri 2,069,062 28,587 60%
Montana 338,604 4,706 48%
Nebraska 624,201 8,576 44%
Nevada 910,058 11,639 137%
New Hampshire 460,533 6,419 84%
New Jersey 3,038,931 42,510 101%
New Mexico 694,525 9,273 93%
New York 6,821,604 94,740 108%
North Carolina 3,227,845 42,464 95%
North Dakota 224,518 3,215 32%
Ohio 4,020,069 56,228 70%
Oklahoma 1,274,826 17,375 57%
Oregon 1,326,521 18,155 107%
Pennsylvania 4,356,898 63,573 77%
Rhode Island 367,776 5,358 143%
South Carolina 1,567,930 20,994 93%
South Dakota 281,468 3,861 37%
Tennessee 2,175,211 29,347 61%
Texas 8,514,441 105,287 66%
Utah 957,748 10,839 83%
Vermont 217,445 3,125 108%
Virginia 2,719,181 36,530 100%
Washington 2,292,228 30,474 107%
West Virginia 635,064 9,404 48%
Wisconsin 1,969,788 27,196 75%
Wyoming 186,434 2,485 40%
*Based on the CDC’s FluSurge model program.  Estimates rely on FluSurge 2.0 Beta Test Software, created by the CDC.  More infor-
mation about the model is available at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/flusurge.htm. 
This scenario examines what would happen during a mild pandemic outbreak.  The severity for this type of outbreak is
based on the 1968 flu pandemic, which is considered relatively mild.  The factors in the FluSurge model are set to
assumptions based on the 1968 pandemic.  These default settings assume an outbreak would be eight weeks in
duration and 35 percent of the population would become ill.  The data for the age demographics are from the Census
Bureau’s Current Population Survey, 2006, available at http://www.census.gov/.  The bed statistics are based on the
total number of licensed 2006 hospital beds (B) (which is available through Kaiser Family Foundation’s State Health
Facts, available at http://www.statehealthfacts.org/cgi-bin/healthfacts.cgi) and the typical hospital bed occupancy rates
(R) (available for 2006 from CDC data and are available in the chart book, Health, United States, 2008).  To determine
the usual number of usual available beds, TFAH used the following formula – ((StatePop/1000) * B) * (1-R).
C.  ANTIVIRALS
Two antiviral medications, Tamiflu® (os-
eltamivir) and Relenza® (zanamivir), have been
shown to be generally effective for treating peo-
ple with the H1N1 virus.  There have been some
cases where the antivirals may not have been ef-
fective, and there are some fears that the virus
could become resistant to antivirals as the season
progresses.  In addition, there are reports that a
new drug, Fludase®, may also prove to be effec-
tive against both the seasonal and H1N1 flu.
In September 2009, CDC issued guidelines sug-
gesting antivirals should be reserved for patients
with more severe cases of the flu or who are in a
high-risk group for developing complications.  In
particular, experts emphasize the importance of
its prudent use and being able to rapidly provide
antivirals to individuals with underlying risks.
According to Flu.gov, “people with certain
health conditions, such as asthma, diabetes, can-
cer, HIV/AIDS, and heart or kidney disease,
may face special needs during flu season.”  
Currently in the United States:13
 13.6 percent of adults have asthma;
 8.3 percent of adults have diabetes;
 4.2 percent of adults have had a heart attack;
 4.3 percent of adults have been told they have
coronary heart disease;
 2.6 percent of adults have had a stroke;
 27.8 percent of adults have high blood pressure;
 18.4 percent of adults currently smoke;
 13.1 percent of adults have chronic kidney
disease; 
 5.9 percent of adults are “extremely” obese
(BMI ≥ 40);
 952,221 Americans aged 13 and older have
AIDS; and
 1,437,180 new cases of cancer were diagnosed
in the past year.
During the past several years, the country has pur-
chased a stockpile of antiviral medications to use
during a flu pandemic.  The medications have a
shelf-life of seven years.  National pandemic plan-
ning called for purchasing enough antivirals to be
able to treat 25 percent of the U.S. population, or
75 million people.  The current federal policy
calls for the purchasing of antivirals to be a shared
federal-state responsibility.  The federal govern-
ment has purchased 44 million treatment courses
for the states, and set a requirement for state gov-
ernments to purchase the remaining 31 million
treatment courses in proportion to the popula-
tion of their states with the federal government
providing a subsidy for 25 percent of the cost.
The federal government has another six million
treatment courses in the stockpile for use in out-
break control.  In the spring, CDC pushed out 25
percent of the federal stockpile to states. As of
September 18, 2009, CDC’s Strategic National
Stockpile (SNS) contains approximately: 39.7 mil-
lion regimens of oseltamivir capsules (Tamiflu),
9,279 regimens of oral suspension oseltamivir, and
10.3 million regimens of zanamivir (Relenza).
In addition to the antivirals received from the fed-
eral portion of the stockpile, according to HHS,
as of September 10, 2009, state and local juris-
dictions have stockpiled over 25 million treat-
ment courses of antivirals, which is about five
million short of the national goal.  Twenty-four
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WAVES OF INFLUENZA AND THE IMPORTANCE OF VACCINES: 1957 PANDEMIC
In February 1957, the Asian influenza pandemic -- A/H2N2— was first identified in the Far East. In
preparation, vaccine production began in late May 1957, and health officials increased surveillance for
flu outbreaks.  Vaccine was available in limited supply by August 1957. The virus first appeared in the
United States in the summer of 1957 through a series of small outbreaks.11 
The 1957 pandemic had three winter waves during the first five years.  There were significant mortal-
ities from the same influenza strain during the 1957/58, 1959/60, and 1962/63 winters.12 The first
wave accounted for 43 percent, the second for 28 percent, and the final wave, five years after the
pandemic began, amounted to 29 percent of deaths.
The 1957 pandemic highlights the importance of a well-designed mass vaccination campaign and of
remaining vigilant in preparedness efforts.  In the present situation, vaccination manufacturers should
continue to produce vaccines doses, and countries need to continue encouraging citizens to be vacci-
nated, even after it appears that the worst has passed.  The World Health Organization (WHO) has
discussed plans to incorporate H1N1 into seasonal flu vaccines next year as part of ongoing vigilance.  
states and D.C. have purchased 100 percent or
more of their federally-subsidized antivirals; 30
states and D.C. have purchased 75 percent or
more; 37 states and D.C have purchased 50 per-
cent or more; and 44 states and D.C. have pur-
chased 25 percent or more.
Combining the federal allocations received by
states with states’ purchases, 13 states do not cur-
rently have enough antivirals to cover 20 percent
of their population: Arizona (16.1 percent); Col-
orado (14.9 percent); Connecticut (15.6 per-
cent); Florida (17.6 percent); Idaho (15.5
percent); Massachusetts (17.7 percent); Mon-
tana (15.8 percent); Nebraska (19.0 percent);
New Mexico (19.0 percent); Oklahoma (17.6
percent); Oregon (15.9 percent); Rhode Island
(18.3 percent); and Utah (17.9 percent).
And another 11 states have only enough antivi-
rals to cover between 20 and 25 percent of their
population (combining their federal allocation
and state purchases): Georgia (20.4 percent);
Kentucky (20.2 percent); Maryland (24.7 per-
cent); Minnesota (21.7 percent); Nevada (21.2
percent); New Hampshire (20.2 percent); North
Carolina (23.0 percent); North Dakota (23.9
percent); Texas (23.2 percent); Washington
(23.1 percent); and Wisconsin (21.5 percent).
This could present a problem if significant por-
tions of people with underlying conditions that
put people at risk, including asthma, diabetes,
cancer, HIV/AIDS, and heart or kidney disease,
become sick in states with limited antivirals avail-
able.  Ensuring enough antivirals to care for at-risk
patients is essential.  Antiviral medications may
also become needed if there is a third wave of
H1N1, especially in the event the virus becomes
more virulent over time as was the case with the
1957 pandemic.  Currently, there is no system in
place to ensure that either federal or state stock-
piles of antivirals are replenished if used.
States that have not purchased their entire al-
lotment of federally-subsidized antivirals have
expressed concerns about different barriers, in-
cluding funding, shelf-life of the drugs, antiviral
resistance, and stockpile management.  Funding
for antiviral purchases has been a major barrier,
even before the current economic recession and
many states say they simply do not have the
funds available.  With deep budget cuts, states
are reluctant to spend scarce resources on pur-
chasing and stockpiling antivirals, particularly
since they have a limited shelf-life (at the com-
mencement of this program it was five years but
was recently changed to seven years).   In addi-
tion, according to the National Governor’s As-
sociation (NGA) a number of states have
“…expressed concerns about the reliance on an-
tivirals given that their effectiveness in treatment
may be compromised by the development of re-
sistance by the pathogen.”14 States also have
questioned the effectiveness of antivirals, par-
ticularly “…if they are used more than 48 hours
after the onset of symptoms in an infected indi-
vidual” and others have expressed concern over
potential side effects.15 So far, antiviral medica-
tions have proven to be effective for H1N1.  Fi-
nally, states have questioned the management of
antiviral stockpiles.  A position statement from
the Association of State and Territorial Health
Officials (ASTHO) notes that “Efficient man-
agement of antiviral stockpiles is essential to re-
duce waste and ensure that maximum benefit is
derived from this countermeasure.”16 As part of
the efficient management of the states’ antiviral
stockpile, ASTHO recommends that states be
given the ability to rotate stocks of antivirals pur-
chased with the federal subsidy with stocks used
for annual seasonal flu response.  This way, the
antivirals are more likely to be used before they
reach their shelf-life expiration date.  This will
help preserve the states’ investments in antivi-
rals and limit the need to repurchase antivirals
that have passed their expiration date.
Nationally, there are also many questions about
the availability of medications suitable for chil-
dren.  As of November 2008, there were just over
3.8 million regimens of pediatric antiviral for-
mulations in the federal stockpile to treat a po-
tential pandemic flu for the nation’s 73.6 million
children.17 The government has not set any tar-
get for stockpiling pediatric antivirals, even
though children and adolescents are known to
often be disproportionately affected by conta-
gious respiratory illnesses, and have been espe-
cially affected by the current H1N1 outbreak.
8
9Antivirals: Federal Stockpile Allocation for States and States’ Purchases
State Population Federal Initial State All Antivirals Percent of Percent of 
Stockpile Subsidy Purchased by Allocation Population 
Allocation Allocation* State (09/10/09) Purchased Covered by 
(06/30/06) Antivirals
Alabama 4,503,726 671,156 472,860 533,553 112.8% 26.7%
Alaska 648,280 96,608 68,065 77,030 113.2% 26.8%
Arizona 5,579,222 831,429 585,780 67,717 11.6% 16.1%
Arkansas 2,727,774 406,500 286,397 382,398 133.5% 28.9%
California (including LA County) 25,591,206 5,284,740 3,723,339 3,809,362 102.3% 35.5%
Colorado 4,547,633 677,699 477,470 215 0.0% 14.9%
Connecticut 3,486,960 519,635 366,107 22,829 6.2% 15.6%
Delaware 818,166 121,925 85,902 180,095 209.7% 36.9%
District of Columbia 557,620 83,098 58,546 90,926 155.3% 31.2%
Florida 16,999,181 2,533,259 1,784,796 461,238 25.8% 17.6%
Georgia 8,676,460 1,292,987 910,968 474,022 52.0% 20.4%
Hawaii 1,248,755 186,093 131,111 172,487 131.6% 28.7%
Idaho 1,367,034 203,719 143,529 8,567 6.0% 15.5%
Illinois (including Chicago) 9,779,966 1,884,997 1,328,067 978,370 73.7% 29.3%
Indiana 6,199,571 923,875 650,912 650,912 100.0% 25.4%
Iowa 2,941,976 438,420 308,887 312,631 101.2% 25.5%
Kansas 2,724,786 406,054 286,084 286,084 100.0% 25.4%
Kentucky 4,118,189 613,703 432,381 216,224 50.0% 20.2%
Louisiana 4,493,665 669,657 471,804 478,734 101.5% 25.6%
Maine 1,309,205 195,101 137,457 164,659 119.8% 27.5%
Maryland 5,512,310 821,458 578,754 541,429 93.6% 24.7%
Massachusetts 6,420,357 956,777 674,093 179,862 26.7% 17.7%
Michigan 10,082,364 1,502,498 1,058,578 1,079,450 102.0% 25.6%
Minnesota 5,064,172 754,675 531,703 346,013 65.1% 21.7%
Mississippi 2,882,594 429,571 302,652 338,648 111.9% 26.7%
Missouri 5,719,204 852,290 600,477 600,477 100.0% 25.4%
Montana 918,157 136,826 96,400 8,174 8.5% 15.8%
Nebraska 1,737,475 258,923 182,423 71,952 39.4% 19.0%
Nevada 2,242,207 334,139 235,416 141,673 60.2% 21.2%
New Hampshire 1,288,705 192,046 135,305 68,000 50.3% 20.2%
New Jersey 8,642,412 1,287,913 907,393 880,293 97.0% 25.1%
New Mexico 1,878,562 279,948 197,236 77,409 39.2% 19.0%
New York (including NYC) 19,212,425 2,863,082 2,017,172 2,444,836 121.2% 27.6%
North Carolina 8,421,190 1,254,946 884,167 677,882 76.7% 23.0%
North Dakota 633,400 94,391 66,503 57,000 85.7% 23.9%
Ohio 11,437,680 1,704,471 1,200,877 1,388,858 115.7% 27.0%
Oklahoma 3,506,469 522,543 368,155 93,765 25.5% 17.6%
Oregon 3,564,330 531,165 374,230 36,668 9.8% 15.9%
Pennsylvania 12,370,761 1,843,521 1,298,844 1,313,517 101.1% 25.5%
Rhode Island 1,076,084 160,361 112,981 36,625 32.4% 18.3%
South Carolina 4,148,744 618,256 435,589 459,960 105.6% 26.0%
South Dakota 764,905 113,988 80,310 80,310 100.0% 25.4%
Tennessee 5,845,208 871,067 613,706 613,706 100.0% 25.4%
Texas 22,103,374 3,293,899 2,320,701 1,827,986 78.8% 23.2%
Utah 2,352,119 350,518 246,956 71,591 29.0% 17.9%
Vermont 619,343 92,296 65,027 71,036 109.2% 26.4%
Virginia 7,365,284 1,097,593 773,304 828,445 107.1% 26.2%
Washington 6,131,298 913,701 643,744 501,206 77.9% 23.1%
West Virginia 1,811,440 269,945 190,189 248,462 130.6% 28.6%
Wisconsin 5,474,290 815,792 574,763 363,729 63.3% 21.5%
Wyoming 502,111 74,826 52,718 74,826 141.9% 29.8%
Total: 278,048,349 43,334,080 30,530,828 24,891,841 81.5% 24.5%
Source: http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/states/antivirals.html (accessed September 23, 2009).
* “Initial allocation” is for subsidized treatment courses only; 25% federal subsidy per treatment course.  Many states have purchased
additional antivirals at unsubsidized prices.
D.  OTHER MEDICAL EQUIPMENT AND THE STRATEGIC
NATIONAL STOCKPILE
The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) consists
of medicine and medical supplies to provide
support during public health emergencies when
state and local resources are overwhelmed and
exhausted.  Each state has plans to quickly re-
ceive and distribute SNS medicine and medical
supplies to local communities.18 A 2008 U.S.
government review of state pandemic plans,
found that 34 states and D.C. were adequately
prepared to acquire and distribute medical
countermeasures during a pandemic, including:
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Col-
orado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Co-
lumbia, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
braska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Vir-
ginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.19  
The federal portion of the flu antiviral medica-
tion stockpile is part of the SNS.  The SNS also
contains back up stores of equipment, such as
ventilators, personal protective equipment such
as N-95 respirator masks, syringes, sterile gloves
and other life-saving medical materiel.
With the H1N1 outbreak, the availability of med-
ical equipment is likely to be limited, and states
may seek help from the SNS to meet their needs.
The quantity of non-pharmaceutical interven-
tions for pandemic influenza in the SNS, such as
N-95 respirator masks and surgical masks, falls
far short of what may be needed. As of the spring
of 2009, the U.S. stockpile contained 105.8 mil-
lion N-95 respirators and 51.7 million surgical
masks.20 CDC reports that 25 million N-95 res-
pirator masks were distributed from the SNS dur-
ing the spring, reducing the nationally-available
number of N-95s to 79.7 million.  The SNS also
contains 37.7 million surgical masks, which are
not considered effective protection against
H1N1.  This is short of the number that many ex-
perts believe would be adequate, but no action
has been taken to replenish this supply and there
are some questions if additional respirator masks
are available due to limited availability. 
E.  TRACKING THE DISEASE
Surveillance issues are also a major concern.  The
flu has traditionally been tracked through a sur-
veillance system through a partnership among
CDC, state, and local health departments, public
health and private clinical laboratories, vital statis-
tics offices, health care providers, clinics, and
emergency departments. The system offers output
measures including number of outpatient consul-
tations for influenza-like illnesses, hospitalization
rates for influenza, pediatric deaths from in-
fluenza, population-wide deaths from pneumonia
and influenza, and virus characteristics.21 How-
ever, the system does not report data in real time,
which is particularly important for tracking a
major outbreak to identify clusters where the out-
break is heaviest or to monitor the severity of the
virus to see if it might be getting more dangerous.
Prior to the onset of H1N1, CDC’s National In-
fluenza Surveillance System consisted of nine sys-
tems to monitor flu viruses and follow the flu’s
geographic spread.  In response to the rapid
spread of H1N1, CDC and the states imple-
mented line-listing reporting for cases of H1N1
beginning in April 2009.22 As cases continued to
grow, the system was adapted to include total
counts of H1N1 cases, hospitalizations, and
deaths.  By August, the updated surveillance sys-
tem transitioned to include only hospitalizations
and deaths, rather than reporting all probable
and confirmed cases of H1N1.
In order to respond to the pandemic, the Presi-
dent’s Council of Advisors on Science and Tech-
nology (PCAST) developed six surveillance
questions that must be asked in order for federal
decision makers to have the data necessary to
make informed policies and recommendations:23
1. About how many people are becoming in-
fected, getting sick, seeking medical care,
being hospitalized, requiring intensive care,
and dying from H1N1?
2. How are the numbers changing over time? 
3. Who is at greatest risk of becoming infected
and most susceptible to severe outcomes?
4. How is the virus changing?
5. Are the medical and public health systems
able to respond adequately?
6. How well do medical and public health re-
sponses work?
To respond quickly and appropriately to the fall
resurgence of H1N1 there must be an even more
efficient and all-encompassing surveillance sys-
tem in place to track the numbers of people in-
10
fected, seeking medical treatment, being hospi-
talized, and dying.  The recently released PCAST
report outlines an ambitious surveillance system
that upgrades the current national surveillance
systems in time for fall 2009 by integrating and
expanding existing systems.  
Carrying out the PCAST recommendations will
require significant time and resources.  Some
experts question whether there are sufficient re-
sources to improve the system on such a short
timetable.  Also, it is important to consider
whether the PCAST recommendations are a
one-time emergency system to respond to
H1N1, or whether this will change the surveil-
lance system for future outbreaks.
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II. VACCINE ISSUES
Vaccination is the best defense against an infec-
tious disease epidemic, but in order to maximize
its utility, implementation must be timely and
cover the most at-risk segments of the population.  
After the initial H1N1 outbreak, the United
States immediately started preparing for H1N1
vaccinations.  In mid-September, the U.S. FDA
cleared vaccines from CSL Limited, MedIm-
mune LLC, Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics
Limited, and sanofi pasteur Inc to help prevent
H1N1. The U.S. FDA approved the vaccine
more rapidly than the European consortium.
CDC has reported that somewhere between 45
million and 52 million doses should be available
by mid-October and to be followed by weekly in-
stallments of vaccine totaling about 195 million
doses by the end of the year.24 Vaccinations are
starting immediately in some other countries,
with many other nations planning to begin im-
munization efforts in October.25  
Once the vaccine begins to be available, the U.S.
strategy is to heavily target at-risk individuals and
then as the vaccine is more widely available, to
offer it to all Americans.  CDC does not antici-
pate any vaccine shortages.
Based on what is currently known about the
H1N1 virus, the federal Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP) issued a list of
priority groups for the H1N1 vaccine including:
 Pregnant women; 
 Household contacts and caregivers for chil-
dren younger than six months of age; 
 Health care and emergency medical services
personnel; 
 All people from six months through 24 years
of age; and
 Persons aged 25 through 64 years who have
health conditions associated with higher risk
of medical complications from influenza.26
Every state has created a vaccination plan, which
includes identifying locations where the public
will be directed to receive vaccinations.  These
locations will vary by state and may include
health care providers, community health centers,
and pharmacies, and/or state and local health
departments may set up special vaccination cen-
ters in places like shopping malls or even drive-
thru stations.  States are providing CDC with
vaccine ordering information, and CDC has con-
tracted with the McKesson Corporation to dis-
tribute vaccine directly to approximately 90,000
locations the states have identified.  The vaccines
will be distributed along with ancillary equip-
ment items like syringes and sterilization swabs
in accordance with state plans.
The states’ mass vaccination plans also include
plans for how to transport vaccines safely, re-dis-
tribute vaccines if some locations require more
or fewer supplies than planned, track vaccina-
tions, and monitor potential adverse effects that
people may have to the vaccine.  In 2008, HHS
conducted a review of state pandemic plans and
found that 29 states and D.C. were adequately
prepared to meet mass vaccination capabilities
based on their plans, including Alabama,
Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware,
D.C., Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi,
Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Is-
land, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wiscon-
sin.27 The additional states were determined to
have some gaps in preparations.  
A.  CHALLENGES FOR MASS VACCINATIONS
Vaccinating millions of Americans presents a se-
ries of challenges.  Traditionally, the United
States does not have strong mechanisms in place
for providing mass vaccinations. 
The annual vaccine for seasonal flu is the largest
existing program for adult vaccinations in the
United States.  However, only a fraction of adults
receive this vaccine.  In some states, the rates of
adult vaccinations for the flu is as low as 25.5
percent (Nevada), and even the state with the
highest vaccination rate, 49.2 percent in South
Dakota, is less than half of the state’s population.
Seasonal flu shots have been largely recom-
mended for seniors above the age of 65, since
they are most at risk for health complications re-
lated to the flu.  Even with targeted efforts to
vaccinate seniors, the rates of annual flu vacci-
nations for seniors is as low as 61.3 percent in
D.C. and no state exceeds 80 percent.  The high-
est rate is 78.1 percent in New Hampshire.
Unlike the typical seasonal flu, the H1N1 virus is
proving to be more dangerous for young adults
than it is for seniors.  Historically, very low rates
of young adults get an annual flu shot, the rate is
24.1 percent for 18 to 49 year olds.  The rate for
this age group is highest in South Dakota at 37.8
percent and is as low as 15.4 percent in Nevada.
This means the group that will be most at risk for
more severe cases H1N1 is less informed and the
least accustomed to getting vaccinations.  One
reason for the low vaccination rates for young
adults is that individuals between 19 and 29 years
old represent one of the largest and fastest grow-
ing segments of the population without health
insurance and often do not have a regular doctor
or do not seek regularized or preventive care.28
Reasons for being uninsured include that many
low-income young adults are ineligible for public
programs, move between schools and jobs, have
shorter job tenure, and work at entry-level tem-
porary jobs that do not provide health insurance.
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SEASONAL FLU VACCINATION RATES FOR ADULTS, 2008
State 18-49 Year Olds 50-64 Year Olds 65 Years and Over Total
Alabama 26.3% (+/- 2.8) 41.8% (+/- 2.8) 68.7% (+/- 2.7) 37.9% (+/- 1.9)
Alaska 26.7% (+/- 3.5) 43.0% (+/- 4.9) 68.5% (+/- 6.3) 35.2% (+/- 2.8)
Arizona 22.2% (+/- 3.6) 39.4% (+/- 4.6) 71.4% (+/- 3.2) 34.8% (+/- 2.6)
Arkansas 27.7% (+/- 2.7) 44.9% (+/- 2.8) 70.5% (+/- 2.5) 40.1% (+/- 1.8)
California 18.4% (+/- 1.5) 39.5% (+/- 2.2) 70.0% (+/- 2.2) 30.8% (+/- 1.1)
Colorado 28.9% (+/- 1.6) 48.6% (+/- 1.9) 77.9% (+/- 1.7) 40.4% (+/- 1.2)
Connecticut 28.3% (+/- 2.6) 45.7% (+/- 3.0) 74.6% (+/- 2.4) 41.1% (+/- 1.8)
Delaware 26.1% (+/- 3.0) 46.7% (+/- 3.9) 69.6% (+/- 3.5) 38.8% (+/- 2.2)
D.C. 30.3% (+/- 2.8) 44.2% (+/- 3.3) 61.3% (+/- 3.5) 38.2% (+/- 2.0)
Florida 17.7% (+/- 2.5) 32.4% (+/- 2.8) 63.5% (+/- 2.5) 31.4% (+/- 1.7)
Georgia 21.8% (+/- 2.3) 38.6% (+/- 2.8) 65.2% (+/- 2.9) 31.8% (+/- 1.7)
Hawaii 31.9% (+/- 2.5) 47.4% (+/- 2.8) 77.1% (+/- 2.5) 44.2% (+/- 1.7)
Idaho 20.8% (+/- 2.3) 39.5% (+/- 2.8) 68.4% (+/- 2.9) 33.0% (+/- 1.7)
Illinois 20.8% (+/- 2.2) 38.6% (+/- 3.0) 63.2% (+/- 2.9) 31.9% (+/- 1.7)
Indiana 21.5% (+/- 2.6) 39.9% (+/- 3.1) 68.6% (+/- 3.1) 34.1% (+/- 1.9)
Iowa 32.7% (+/- 2.4) 48.2% (+/- 2.7) 76.5% (+/- 2.2) 44.8% (+/- 1.7)
Kansas 26.9% (+/- 2.0) 43.5% (+/- 2.1) 72.0% (+/- 1.9) 38.9% (+/- 1.4)
Kentucky 25.8% (+/-2.5) 43.6% (+/- 2.6) 73.6% (+/- 2.3) 38.6% (+/- 1.7)
Louisiana 27.5% (+/- 2.3) 43.6% (+/- 2.6) 68.0% (+/- 2.8) 38.2% (+/- 1.6)
Maine 25.0% (+/- 2.1) 47.3% (+/- 2.3) 74.6% (+/- 2.2) 40.6% (+/- 1.5)
Maryland 26.8% (+/- 2.0) 46.3% (+/- 2.4) 69.8% (+/- 2.5) 38.5% (+/- 1.4)
Massachusetts 28.5% (+/- 1.6) 45.8% (+/- 1.8) 72.0% (+/- 1.7) 40.5% (+/- 1.1)
Michigan 23.0% (+/- 1.8) 41.8% (+/- 2.1) 70.0% (+/- 2.0) 35.7% (+/- 1.3)
Minnesota 36.8% (+/- 2.9) 50.4% (+/- 2.9) 76.4% (+/- 2.6) 46.6% (+/- 2.0)
Mississippi 24.7% (+/- 2.2) 38.4% (+/- 2.3) 67.5% (+/- 2.2) 35.5% (+/- 1.5)
Missouri 26.5% (+/- 2.8) 45.1% (+/- 3.3) 71.3% (+/- 2.8) 39.2% (+/- 2.0)
Montana 25.3% (+/- 2.6) 40.9% (+/- 2.5) 69.3% (+/- 2.4) 37.8% (+/- 1.7)
Nebraska 33.0% (+/- 2.4) 51.3% (+/- 2.3) 75.7% (+/- 1.8) 45.2% (+/- 1.6)
Nevada 15.4% (+/- 2.3) 29.6% (+/- 3.5) 57.1% (+/- 3.9) 25.5% (+/- 1.8)
New Hampshire 28.9% (+/- 2.2) 49.4% (+/- 2.5) 78.1% (+/- 2.1) 42.6% (+/- 1.6)
New Jersey 22.9% (+/- 1.9) 39.9% (+/- 2.2) 65.9% (+/- 2.2) 34.8% (+/- 1.3)
New Mexico 28.0% (+/- 2.6) 42.3% (+/- 2.8) 69.7% (+/- 2.6) 38.6% (+/- 1.8)
New York 24.8% (+/- 2.1) 43.9% (+/- 2.6) 70.9% (+/- 2.4) 37.6% (+/- 1.5)
North Carolina 28.4% (+/- 1.7) 47.3% (+/- 1.9) 73.0% (+/- 1.6) 40.4% (+/- 1.2)
North Dakota 30.0% (+/- 2.8) 45.4% (+/- 2.7) 73.2% (+/- 2.4) 42.1% (+/- 1.9)
Ohio 24.2% (+/- 1.9) 42.0% (+/- 2.0) 70.3% (+/- 1.8) 37.1% (+/- 1.3)
Oklahoma 27.8% (+/- 2.0) 51.3% (+/- 2.4) 73.2% (+/- 2.1) 41.8% (+/- 1.4)
Oregon 20.7% (+/- 2.3) 43.2% (+/- 2.7) 70.1% (+/- 2.6) 35.3% (+/- 1.7)
Pennsylvania 23.7% (+/- 2.0) 43.2% (+/- 2.3) 71.7% (+/- 2.0) 38.3% (+/- 1.4)
Rhode Island 28.1% (+/- 2.8) 49.9% (+/- 3.0) 74.0% (+/- 2.6) 42.0% (+/- 2.0)
South Carolina 23.6% (+/- 2.3) 42.9% (+/- 2.7) 68.0% (+/- 2.4) 36.3% (+/- 1.6)
South Dakota 37.8% (+/- 2.7) 53.6% (+/- 2.6) 76.3% (+/- 2.1) 49.2% (+/- 1.8)
Tennessee 29.0% (+/- 3.2) 42.7% (+/- 3.1) 70.8% (+/- 2.8) 39.5% (+/- 2.1)
Texas 24.8% (+/- 1.9) 42.1% (+/- 2.5) 71.1% (+/- 2.2) 35.4% (+/- 1.5)
Utah 30.7% (+/- 2.4) 48.6% (+/- 3.2) 73.3% (+/- 3.0) 39.8% (+/- 1.8)
Vermont 26.1% (+/- 2.1) 46.9% (+/- 2.2) 73.4% (+/- 2.2) 40.2% (+/- 1.5)
Virginia 29.3% (+/- 3.3) 48.0% (+/- 3.6) 73.1% (+/- 3.1) 40.7% (+/- 2.4)
Washington 26.3% (+/- 1.3) 44.2% (+/- 1.4) 71.4% (+/- 1.4) 38.0% (+/- 0.9)
West Virginia 23.5% (+/- 2.4) 46.5% (+/- 2.9) 71.1% (+/- 2.8) 39.1% (+/- 1.8)
Wisconsin 28.9% (+/- 2.8) 44.4% (+/- 3.2) 73.0% (+/- 3.0) 40.5% (+/- 2.0)
Wyoming 27.7% (+/- 2.0) 44.8% (+/- 2.1) 70.7% (+/- 2.1) 39.5% (+/- 1.4)
National Totals 24.1% (+/- 0.5 ) 42.0% (+/- 0.5 ) 69.5% (+/- 0.5 ) 36.1% (+/- 0.7)
Source: Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System.  For more information on the methodology, see Appendix A.
Vaccines and Payment Issues
Also, experts believe children may be at in-
creased risk for contracting H1N1.  Typically,
children receive some required vaccinations be-
fore starting school through their health care
provider or sometimes through public health
departments, but few children regularly get flu
shots, which are available later in the fall and are
not required for school entry.  Officials around
the country are exploring ways to quickly try to
reach children when an H1N1 vaccine becomes
widely available, including the possibility of mak-
ing vaccines available through schools.  U.S. Sec-
retary of Education Arne Duncan believes “to
open our doors [at schools] and be part of the
solution really makes sense.”29 In fact, hundreds
of schools across the country are participating
in what could be the most widespread vaccina-
tion effort since polio.30 A survey by the National
School Boards Association found that approxi-
mately three-quarters of school districts plan to
allow vaccinations to be distributed in school
buildings.31 In New York City, all primary school
aged children will be offered both the H1N1
and seasonal flu vaccination at no cost.32
The hybrid public-private vaccine delivery sys-
tem in the United States makes the distribution
and administration of vaccines complicated.
The health insurance system is comprised of
thousands of separate coverage arrangements
governed by multiple laws that lack common
content or coverage and payment requirements.
Some issues presented by this system, in the con-
text of H1N1 mass vaccination include:
 The federal government will pay for the actual
vaccine, but not the administration of the vac-
cine.  Instead, the federal government will work
with states and localities to determine how and
where to distribute the shots effectively.
 The shots will be made available in varied ways
in every state and locality in the country based
on the plans that each state has in place to
best meet local need.
 Vaccinations will be available through a num-
ber of different places, including through
doctors’ offices, through public health de-
partment distribution locations, and likely
through private pharmacies in stores. 
 Payment methods for the administration of
the vaccines could vary depending on where
a person gets a shot.
 Some insurance companies will cover admin-
istration of the shots, while others may not.
 If a person gets a vaccination through a pub-
lic health department mass vaccination loca-
tion or through a private pharmacy, the
payment for the administration of the shot
may be covered by the government in some
places or the state may charge people for their
shot or the state may try to bill the person’s
insurance, depending on the state’s plan.
 There are no systematic policies for assuring
third party reimbursement for administra-
tion of vaccines in emergency situations,
even when an individual has insurance.
Some private insurance companies have vol-
untarily indicated they will pay, but how
broad that coverage will be remains to be de-
termined.  America’s Health Insurance
Plans (AHIP) has stated that, “Every year
health plans contribute to the seasonal flu
vaccination campaign in several ways: a)
Health plans communicate directly with
plan sponsors and members on the current
ACIP recommendations and encourage im-
munization; they also provide information
on where to get vaccinations, and who to
contact with any questions. b) Just as health
plans have provided extensive coverage for
the administration of seasonal flu vaccines
in the past, public health planners can make
the assumption that health plans will provide
reimbursement for the administration of a
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MONITORING VACCINE SAFETY
As with any immunization or medication, receiving a flu shot has the potential to cause various side ef-
fects.  Generally, reported side effects for influenza vaccines include post vaccination fever, soreness
at the vaccination site, runny nose, headache, vomiting, and abdominal pain.  The symptoms are typi-
cally mild, and rarely interfere with the recipient’s daily routine.33
HHS created the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS).  VAERS is a cooperative program
for vaccine safety between CDC and FDA. The system collects information about adverse events and
possible side effects that occur after the administration of U.S. vaccines.
novel (A) H1N1 vaccine to their members
by private sector providers in both tradi-
tional settings e.g., doctor’s office, ambula-
tory clinics, health care facilities, and in
non-traditional settings, where contracts with
insurers have been established.” [sic.]34
 According to CDC, providers may charge
patients if they are uninsured. The admin-
istration fee cannot exceed the regional
Medicare vaccine administration fee.  How-
ever, there will be no administration fee for
vaccination in public-health organized
large scale vaccination clinics.35
Medicare will reimburse for their beneficiar-
ies.  Medicaid coverage is determined by the
states, and, according to the U.S. Govern-
ment Accountability Office (GAO), in four
states, Medicaid does not even cover regular
flu vaccinations for adults.36
 For the uninsured or in places where individ-
uals are expected to pay for shots, the cost may
deter many individuals from seeking vaccines.
One in seven Americans lack health insur-
ance.37 The Seasonal Influenza and Pandemic
Preparation Act of 2009, introduced by Sen.
Tom Harkin in May, would establish a nation-
wide voluntary influenza vaccination program
under which any individual may receive an an-
nual influenza vaccine, free of charge.38
Three major insurance issues surround H1N1 im-
munizations.  These issues may create barriers that
deter low-income families and individuals from
seeking immunizations.  The concerns include:  
 Determining whether an insurance provider
will require a co-pay or deductable for receiv-
ing an H1N1 immunization;
Making it easy for providers to bulk bill insur-
ance companies or government insurance
providers for payment though a method called
roster billing, instead of filling out individual
paperwork claims for every single patient; and 
 Allowing for out-of-network coverage, so that
patients can go to available locations adminis-
tering vaccines without concern for whether
they are part of their official insurance network.
The federal government has direct oversight re-
sponsibilities for certain health insurance arrange-
ments and can set policies for these programs,
including Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children’s
Health Insurance Program (CHIP). In addition,
the federal government plays a key oversight role
in the case of health benefit plans covering the
federal civilian and military workforce (Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) and the U.S. De-
partment of Defense (DOD)).  HHS and the U.S.
Department of Labor (DOL) also oversee the
state regulated insurance market for both small
group and individual coverage as a result of the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA).   Finally, DOL oversees the admin-
istration of health benefit plans offered by private
employers.  As of 2009, around 60 percent of pri-
vate employers sponsored health benefit plans for
their employees.39 Virtually all of these plans op-
erate under the authority of the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act (ERISA).  Finally,
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) oversees the
awarding to tax-free status to the 2,900 non-gov-
ernmental, nonprofit hospitals in the United
States, which includes requiring these hospitals
meet defined “community benefit” standards.
Sara Rosenbaum, JD, Chair of the Department
of Health Policy at The George Washington Uni-
versity School of Public Health and Health Serv-
ices, conducted an analysis for TFAH to
determine what actions federal agencies could
take to help improve vaccine administration is-
sues, which found that as of mid-September:
Medicare has updated and clarified their poli-
cies to make sure the administration of shots
are covered for their beneficiaries at no cost,
including no deductibles or coinsurance pay-
ments, and to permit roster billing.  Medicare
has not clarified their policies around out-of-
network coverage for beneficiaries or
Medicare Advantage patients.40
Medicaid should update their policies around
co-pays, roster billing, or out-of-network is-
sues.  They should clarify that their polices
should provide coverage for administration of
the vaccine and out-of-network medical care
related to H1N1 and allow for roster billing.
The program covers 60 million individuals in-
cluding the nation’s most vulnerable low-in-
come and medically high-risk individuals.
H1N1 vaccine administration is covered for
children enrolled in Medicaid through the
early and periodic screening, diagnostic and
treatment benefit (EPSDT).
 DOL has the ability to communicate with
ERISA-governed health benefit plans offered
by private employers to encourage them to
provide information to all of their beneficiaries
about the importance of getting vaccinated;
waive co-pay requirements for vaccinations;
and waive out-of-network restrictions for vacci-
nations; and provide state and local public
health departments with information about
vaccination rates and progress to the extent
covered by law (ERISA does not pre-empt pub-
lic health reporting requirements). 
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OPM and DOD can also communicate with the
contractors that manage their health plans to
encourage that they provide information to all
of their beneficiaries about the importance of
getting vaccinated; waive co-pay requirements
for vaccinations; and waive out-of-network re-
strictions for vaccinations; and provide state
and local public health departments with in-
formation about vaccination rates and progress
to the extent covered by law.
 The U.S. Treasury Department, of which the
IRS is one of the divisions, could remind non-
profit hospitals that immunization is a key
community benefit and encourage that they
actively work to provide vaccines to the com-
munity and extend hours and their workforce
to help state and local health departments
with community vaccination efforts.  The IRS
found has found that in the past, nearly one
in two nonprofit hospitals spent nothing on
immunizations, and for those who did, many
may have charged for the care.41
Another challenge is that many individuals may
need two vaccines during the upcoming flu sea-
son, one for the seasonal flu and one for
H1N1.42 Health officials have expressed con-
cerns that many individuals could become con-
fused and only try to get one of the two shots,
or that some individuals who are at high risk for
seasonal flu may put off getting their seasonal
flu shot until both shots are available and they
can try to get the shots at the same time.
Health officials advise that people should get
their seasonal flu shot as soon as possible, and
then get an H1N1 shot as soon as they can once
it is available.  
In order to get as many people vaccinated as pos-
sible, CDC has recommended extending the tra-
ditional flu vaccination period, normally October
through January, to September through May.43
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UPGRADING FLU VACCINE DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION IN THE
UNITED STATES
In an effort to increase the availability of vaccines for infectious diseases and potential bioterrorism threats,
Congress created the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA).  BARDA
awarded a $487 million multiple year contract in January 2009 to Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics, Inc. to
build the first United States facility to manufacture cell-based vaccine for seasonal and pandemic influenza.44 
GLOBAL DISPARITIES OF VACCINES
The manufacturing capacity for influenza vaccines is very large globally, yet even if all companies worked
on producing only a vaccine for H1N1 there would still not be enough for everyone in the world.45
During a global health crisis it is imperative that all countries, rich or poor, have equal access to
vaccines.  For the H1N1 vaccine, three major manufacturers -- GlaxoSmithKline, Sanofi-Aventis, and
Novartis -- have all indicated the possibility of offering tiered pricing, as well as donating up to 100
million doses to a stockpile for poor countries.46 In addition, the United States has announced that it
will donate 10 percent of its H1N1 vaccine supply to the World Health Organization for use in low-
income countries.  The other countries making donations are Australia, Brazil, Britain, France, Italy,
New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland.47
Poor countries face issues with acquiring adequate amounts of vaccines, but fortunately they have an
advantage in mass distributions.  Many poor countries have had recent experience with mass
vaccinations against diseases such as polio, measles, and hepatitis B.48  
Wealthy countries, manufacturers, and regulatory agencies all have a responsibility to continue to
make sure vaccinations are distributed quickly and fairly to all countries. 
IV. BUDGET CUTS AND HEALTH DEPARTMENT
WORKFORCE SHORTAGES
Public health departments around the country
are understaffed and underfunded, which
makes it challenging to carry out pandemic
plans.  The current economic crisis makes the
problem even worse, as many state and local
health departments are facing budget cuts.
Historically, funding for public health emer-
gency preparedness has focused on responding
to the crisis of the moment.  This has lead to a
pattern where new funds are appropriated to re-
spond to a new threat, but these funds are typi-
cally a one-time allocation or erode over time,
and do not address many of the underlying
problems in the system.
After September 11, 2001 and the anthrax at-
tacks, Congress made a major investment aimed
at upgrading America’s public health system.
However, the funding was only a fraction of what
would be needed to truly modernize public
health systems across the country.  Over the
years, this funding for state and local public
health preparedness has eroded.  In FY 2009,
funding for state and local public health pre-
paredness was down 25 percent from FY 2005
levels.  Although the current Administration
proposed restoring $15 million in state and local
preparedness dollars in the FY 2010 budget, that
does not undo the damage the cuts in previous
years had on public health preparedness.
During the spring outbreak, the capacity of
health departments to track, investigate, and con-
tain cases of H1N1 was pushed to the limit due to
lack of resources.  In addition to the 25 percent
cut of federal funds to support state and local pre-
paredness from FY 2005 to FY2009, 48 states are
experiencing shortfalls in their budgets for FY
2010.  The shortfalls total $168 billion, which is
one-quarter of state budgets, according to the
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.49 Public
health funding is typically discretionary spending
in states and therefore, often experiences signif-
icant cuts during economic downturns.  While
few states allocate funds directly for public health
preparedness, state and local funding is essential
for supporting public health infrastructure and
core capacities of health departments.  
Health departments around the country are also
facing severe workforce shortages.  Around one-
fourth of public health workers are eligible for re-
tirement.50 That problem is worsening as state
and local governments cut their budgets.  The
National Association of County and City Health
Officials (NACCHO) found that local health de-
partments eliminated 8,000 staff positions in the
first half of 2009, which adds to the 7,000 local
public health jobs lost in 2008.51 According to
NACCHO, local health department staffing lev-
els this coming fall and winter are less than they
were this past spring, even though demands are
greater as the H1N1 outbreak is expected to be
much more widespread.  The Association of State
and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO) reports
similar problems at state health departments.  
States are further hampered by current restric-
tions which do not allow employees who are sup-
ported by federal dollars to be reassigned or
“loaned” from their categorically defined and
funded programs to help with the H1N1 re-
sponse at the discretion of local health depart-
ments.  For instance, without new direction
from the federal government, an employee sup-
ported by federal dollars in the environmental
health division may not be temporarily reas-
signed to work on the H1N1 response.  CDC has
recently issued guidance to states to allow for
greater flexibility on the use of categorical funds
and assets to respond to H1N1, but other fed-
eral agencies, including the Substance Abuse
and Mental Health Services Administration
(SAMSHA), the Health Resources and Services
Administration (HRSA), and the Women, In-
fants, and Children (WIC) Program, have not.
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STAFFORD DISASTER RELIEF AND EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE ACT
The Stafford Act is a federal law that provides statutory authority for a Presidential declaration of an
emergency or a declaration of a major disaster.52 The Act helps quickly disperse federal funds to state
and local governments, families, individuals, and certain nonprofit organizations.  Actions the Act
authorizes include setting up temporary housing, dispersing grants for immediate needs of families and
individuals, the repair of public infrastructure, and organizing emergency communications systems.  
Generally, in order for assistance to be granted, the President must receive a request from the
Governor of an affected state, unless the incident involves primarily Federal interests.   When
considering whether to grant relief for the request the President evaluates a number of factors,
including the cause of the catastrophe, damages, needs, certification by state officials that state and
local governments will comply with cost sharing and other requirements, and official requests for
assistance.   The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has established thresholds which
are evaluated by the President and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials in determining
whether to declare a disaster or emergency.
By way of executive orders, the President has delegated the responsibility of administering the
provisions of the Stafford act to FEMA.53 Funding for the Stafford Act is appropriated to the Disaster
Relief Fund (DRF), which is overseen by DHS.  Money in the DRF is a “no-year” appropriation and
remains in the fund until it is used in full. 
The Stafford Act authorities were designed to address localized natural disasters.  Some experts
suggest revisions may be needed to facilitate appropriate federal support in response to an
emergency, such as a pandemic.
V. PREPAREDNESS IN COMMUNITIES
Clear, consistent, culturally-competent commu-
nication with the public is essential during a dis-
ease outbreak so that health departments and
providers can let people know about latest de-
velopments, how to best protect themselves,
when they should limit their public activities and
avoid going to work or school, and when and
where they should go for medications or vacci-
nations.  This includes letting people know the
prioritization plans for vaccinations when limited
amounts of vaccine may be available or when it is
more important to vaccinate a target population
in advance of the rest of a community.
Health officials will rely on communicating the
importance of non-pharmaceutical interventions
(NPIs) to reduce people’s exposure to the virus.
As noted by GAO, some health officials hope that
spreading out the number of people who become
ill at any given time, “can help the health care sys-
tem by reducing the anticipated influx of patients
by limiting the rate of disease transmission.”54
Sick Leave
One proven non-pharmaceutical intervention
to slow or curb the spread of a pandemic is to
stay home if you are sick, or keep your child
home if they are sick.  At a news conference in
late April President Obama emphasized this: “If
you are sick, stay home.  If your child is sick,
keep them out of school.”55  
This advice presents special challenges for the
nearly half of American workers in the private sec-
tor who do not have any paid sick leave available.
This amounts to more than 59 million people.56
This statistic also disproportionately includes
women, low-wage, and part-time workers.  
In an already unstable economic situation, indi-
viduals who are sick and should stay home may
still go to work for fear of lost wages or losing
their job.  According to Debra L. Ness, the pres-
ident of the National Partnership for Women
and Families, “This could be the beginning of a
spiral into economic disaster.  People can’t just
cavalierly put their jobs or paychecks at risk.”57
This could mean that restaurants, child care
centers, nursing homes, hotels, public transit sys-
tems, schools, and offices across the country
could be operated and run by individuals in-
fected with the flu who should be at home, not
at work.58 In addition to lacking personal sick
leave, another 100 million workers do not have
sick leave that enables them to take time off to
care for an ill child, spouse, or parent.
In new guidance issued on August 19, 2009,
CDC recommends actions businesses should
take to decrease the spread of influenza in the
workplace during the 2009 flu season.59 One
recommendation is to keep sick workers home
and not let them return to work until 24 hours
after their fever is gone.  The guidance stresses
the importance of allowing sick workers to stay
home without fear of losing their job.  
Draft guidance by the U.S.  Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) suggests that the govern-
ment may extend new leave policies to federal em-
ployees providing care to family members with the
H1N1 flu.60 Federal employees would be able to
use accrued or accumulated sick leave to stay
home to care for a family member if a doctor or
other health official determines that their pres-
ence in the workplace might jeopardize the health
of co-workers and to use advanced sick leave if they
have exhausted their annual allotment.  The pro-
posal is not likely to go into effect until well into
the H1N1 outbreak, however, and the proposed
rules would not affect government contractors,
who often do not have any sick leave available.
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Types of Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions
Type of NPI Definition
Isolation The separation or restriction of movement of individuals ill with an infectious disease 
to prevent transmission to others.
Quarantine The separation or restriction of movement of individuals exposed to an infectious 
disease, but not yet ill, who may become infectious to others.
Social distancing Measures taken to decrease the frequency of contact among people, such as the closing
of schools, shopping malls, or movie theaters, or the cancellation of large public events.
Infection control Hygiene measures to reduce the risk of transmission from infected individuals to uninfected
individuals, including hand washing, cough etiquette, use of masks, and disinfection.
Source: CDC
A.  CHILDREN’S ISSUES
How to treat and care for the nation’s 73.6 mil-
lion children and adolescents during an in-
fluenza pandemic raises unique concerns.61 An
estimated 67 million of these children and youth
are in schools or childcare facilities at any given
point during the week.62 With so many children
spending a large percentage of their time at
school it is important to consider what will hap-
pen in the fall and winter of the H1N1 pandemic. 
Children are not “small adults” and special con-
sideration needs to be given to complicated is-
sues ranging from child-appropriate doses of
medications and vaccines to caring for children
if schools and childcare facilities are closed for
extended periods.  Parents and other caregivers
may also become sick during a pandemic, com-
plicating their ability to care for children.
Children are at disproportionate risk for spread-
ing virus (and have been disproportionately af-
fected by H1N1 so far).  According to findings
reported by CDC, children ages five to 14 be-
came ill with H1N1 at a rate of 147 per 100,000
people in Chicago from April to July— a rate 14
times higher than that of the elderly.63    
Public health experts agree that children infected
with influenza are major transmitters of the dis-
ease. Children gather in groups -- in school, in
childcare settings, on playgrounds, in households,
and elsewhere -- and often are careless when it
comes to their personal hygiene.  They cough and
sneeze, not always taking care to do so into a tis-
sue, or into their sleeves, which many pediatri-
cians consider the next best alternative.  Instead,
they cough into their hands, and then touch other
objects -- a door knob, a computer mouse or key-
board, toys -- or other people, including other
children. Moreover, it is challenging to try to
teach very young children “cough etiquette,” or
to get them to wash their hands frequently. 
Three federal agencies (HHS, Department of
Homeland Security, Department of Education),
and Sesame Workshop, the nonprofit educational
organization behind the television show Sesame
Street, have gotten together to launch a public
service advertising (PSA) campaign.  The PSA
uses Sesame Street’s Elmo and Gordon to en-
courage children and families to practice healthy
habits including washing hands, sneezing into the
bend of your arm, and avoiding contact with your
eyes, nose and mouth to minimize the spread of
H1N1.  The PSAs can be found at www.flu.gov and
will also be distributed nationwide and aired on
airtime donated by television stations.64
Vaccinating Young Children
Currently, ACIP recommends that all children
aged six months to 18 years should be vaccinated
against the flu every year. In 2004, ACIP expanded
the age range for routine vaccination to include
children aged six to 23 months, and finally in 2006,
they further expanded the recommendation to in-
clude all children aged 24 to 59 months.65 
CDC explains the expansion to a greater num-
ber of children because of the following:
 Growing evidence that the flu vaccine is ef-
fective and safe for children;
 Accumulated evidence that the flu has sub-
stantial adverse impacts among children and
their contacts such as school absenteeism, in-
creased antibiotic use, medical care visits, and
parental work loss; and 
 The expectation that an age-based flu vaccine
recommendation for all children and adoles-
cents will improve vaccination rates among
children who already should be receiving the
vaccination due to another factor putting
them at heightened risk.66   
The decision to recommend flu vaccinations for
all children six month and older weighs the ben-
efits and risks associated with vaccinating chil-
dren.  A number of studies found a low risk of
minor adverse events in vaccinated children, such
as local skin reaction to injected vaccine, and
wheeze or irritability after nasal dose of vaccine,
and serious adverse affects, including hospital-
ization or death, were almost negligible.67,68,69
Although recommended for children under
two, other issues exist when it comes to vacci-
nating very young children.  The current flu vac-
cine is given annually, and young children are
recommended to get two doses the first year for
optimal results.70 It is important to note that
children are recommended to receive up to 16
different immunizations before turning two,
and adding two more injections to an already
crowded schedule can be difficult for parents.
Traditionally in the United States, there has
been a gap in vaccination rates for preschool
aged children.  Around 20 percent of preschool-
ers have gone without recommended vaccinates
every year for the past three decades, leaving ap-
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School-Based Actions to Reduce Exposure
proximately two million children at increased
risk of preventable diseases.71 Rates of low vac-
cination are particularly a concern in minority
and low-income communities, where it is often
difficult to reach and communicate with parents
before children enter a formal school system.
Some reasons that contribute to this vaccination
gap include: an underfunded and underutilized
immunization registry system; public misper-
ceptions about the importance of vaccines and
their safety; and systemic issues, such as vaccine
supply, distribution, and inadequate funding.
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CDC issued new guidance on school responses
to influenza just before the start of the 2009-
2010 school year.72 CDC includes two action
plans, the first is to be followed if the fall out-
break has similar severity as in the spring 2009,
and a second set of guidance in the case that the
fall outbreak is more severe than the spring 2009
outbreak.  In each set of guidance, CDC recom-
mends a series of activities to reduce exposure
of students, faculty and staff to the flu viruses
within the school setting.
The actions recommended for the current level of
severity of influenza disease include ensuring that: 
 Ill students stay home
 Students who fall ill during the school day be
promptly isolated while awaiting parents to
take them home
 All students are able to perform adequate
hand hygiene
 Students are encouraged to practice respira-
tory etiquette
 Facility staff perform routine cleaning of fre-
quently touched surfaces
 Students at high risk for complications seek
early treatment if they have symptoms of flu
 Specialized schools serving students at high
risk of complications consider selective school
dismissals if flu is prevalent in the community.
Under conditions of greater severity, more dis-
ruptive non-pharmaceutical interventions might
be recommended.  These include active screen-
ing of students upon arrival, allowing high risk
students or staff to stay home, household quar-
antine of well siblings of ill students, increasing
the physical distance of students within the
school, extending the isolation period for sick
students, or school dismissals.
The most disruptive intervention to reduce
school-based exposure to flu is school dismissal.
The effect of school dismissal on reducing trans-
mission in the school or in the community is dif-
ficult to measure.  While observational studies
and models have shown mixed results, the bene-
ficial effect of school dismissal is most apparent
in pandemics with a high proportion of disease
among school-age children.  Given the high at-
tack rate among children in this pandemic and
the frequent clusters and outbreaks reported in
schools both in the spring and since schools
started reopening in the late summer and early
fall, school dismissals in this pandemic might be
useful under conditions of increased severity.
After the initial outbreak, on May 1, 2009 CDC
issued guidance recommending school dismissal
when H1N1 infection was detected in any stu-
dent.73 Shortly after, as more information about
H1N1 was collected and the virus was found to
be less harmful than anticipated, on May 4 CDC
released updated guidance recommending
school closings only if the absenteeism of faculty
or students became so large that it interfered
with the school’s ability to function.74  
In the weeks following the first cases of H1N1
hundreds of schools closed across the United
States.  In response to school closings Kathleen
Sebelius, the health secretary acknowledged
that, “There is a large ripple effect.  What hap-
pens to the parents? Where do those children
go? Do you close the day care center if a younger
sibling is there? Many schools’ and communi-
ties’ emergency plans will be put to the test dur-
ing the weeks and months to come.”75 
Closing schools for up to two weeks triggers a
number of social corollaries. Seeking alternative
child care arrangements is especially compli-
cated when the intent is to keep children sepa-
rated from one another. Workplace absenteeism
increases as parents need to stay home with chil-
dren, who may or may not be ill.  It is important
to remember that U.S. schools provide more
than educational services -- including subsidized
meals and before and after school care -- which
also are disrupted when a school closes. A large
percentage of low-income families rely on food
assistance programs like the National School
Lunch and Breakfast program, and in the case
of school closures many children could go hun-
gry.  The U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) is exploring contingency plans for al-
ternative delivery of meals to students in the
event of school closings.
Many of those who are likely to be affected most
by a resurgence of H1N1 are vulnerable popu-
lations such as pregnant women, uninsured, and
minorities.  The elderly are not considered high-
risk for H1N1, but they are a high-risk category
for the seasonal flu and they often also have un-
derlying medical conditions.
Individuals with mental illnesses, the homeless, and
undocumented immigrants are also categories of
special concern, as they are often underserved or
un-served by the medical community.  Undocu-
mented individuals may not seek medical care due
to lack of coverage and fear of potential legal reper-
cussions.78 This presented an issue in a number of
communities during the spring outbreak of H1N1,
and can be particularly problematic during an in-
fectious disease outbreak, when the individual may
be putting others in the community at risk by not
seeking care.79 ASTHO has developed an At-Risk
Populations and Pandemic Influenza: Planning Guid-
ance for State, Territorial, Tribal, and Local Health De-
partments to assist states in planning.80
B.  AT-RISK COMMUNITY ISSUES
Multiple reports reveal that H1N1 has had a dis-
proportionate effect on racial and ethnic mi-
norities.  
 In Chicago, a study found that from April
through late July African-Americans were hos-
pitalized at a rate of nine per 100,000, Hispanics
at a rate of eight per 100,000 and whites at a rate
of two per 100,000.  Health officials say that the
difference is most likely not genetic, but rather
because some minorities suffer from more
chronic conditions like asthma and diabetes
that make them more vulnerable to the flu.
 African-American and Hispanic residents in
Boston account for more than three of every
four residents who have visited the hospital in
the recent months because of H1N1.81 In
Boston, 71 city residents were hospitalized
with swine flu -- 49 percent of whom were
African-American and 28 percent were His-
panic, double each minority group’s presence
in the city.  The two groups also account for a
disproportionate share of the 477 laboratory
confirmed cases of H1N1 in Boston.
Disease specialists suggest that overcrowding in
urban areas and underlying chronic conditions
such as diabetes make African-Americans and
Hispanics more prone to the complications of
influenza.  
Health workers in the city of Boston are pledg-
ing to improve outreach to the more vulnerable
communities for the fall flu season.  The Mayor
of Boston, Thomas M. Menino, also promised
that he would make it possible for all city em-
ployees to take two hours of paid work time to
get flu shots when they become available.
Racial and ethnic minority communities tend to
experience higher rates of injury, disease, trau-
matic stress, death and loss in public health
emergencies.  According to Drexel University’s
Center for Health Equality, the reasons behind
these disparities include:82
 Historic societal patterns of neglect;
 Lower socioeconomic status;
 Culture and language barriers;
 Distrust of service providers;
 Lower perceived risk from disasters and lim-
ited preparation; and
 Reliance on informal channels of information.
A literature review of studies on the prepared-
ness of racially and ethnically diverse communi-
ties found limited information regarding
emergency preparedness and minorities.83
Many studies that exist highlight problems with
information, communication, and education.  
1. Minority Populations 
In just the few days that schools were closed
across the country, many state and local public
health officials found the implementation of
school closures to be difficult and burdensome
on communities.76 Children were being
dropped off at libraries and community centers
because so many parents lacked the sick leave to
stay home with their children.  
In a public opinion survey conducted by the
Harvard School of Public Health, over half of
parents polled said that school or daycare clo-
sures would cause them or someone in their
household to miss work.77 Forty-three percent
said this kind of closure would likely cause a loss
of income and money problems, and over a
quarter of parents responded that having to stay
home with children would cause them to lose
their job or business.  The poll also showed that
school closures would have a disproportionate
impact on minorities.
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 Currently, emergency preparedness informa-
tion is disseminated primarily through the In-
ternet, which is a problem because its use is
often limited for minorities, particularly for
people whose first language is not English.   In
fact, only one in three emergency preparedness
websites include content in foreign language.  
One study also found that the mere translation
of English-language material to other languages
is not enough -- often times the literal transla-
tion does not correctly translate -- leading to mis-
communication of the public health message.  
 Communication messages to minority and im-
migrant populations must be targeted specifi-
cally to each group, according to a 2007 study
published in the Journal of Health Care for the
Poor and Underserved, because “cultural groups
respond to risk and crisis communication on
the basis of their perceptions and ways of think-
ing, and these differ from group to group.”84  
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In order to help minority communities be re-
silient, they must be provided with culturally ap-
propriate information, resources, and training
for emergency preparedness.  After Hurricane
Katrina, one study found that “a majority of
African-Americans and Asians, and half of His-
panics feel they can no longer rely on the Amer-
ican system and its institutions to protect their
family during a crisis.”85 Because of mistrust
from minority populations toward the American
health system, the best way to overcome cultural
barriers and spread public health messages is
through community based organizations.  
Training community members as volunteer com-
munity health workers or health promoters is an
important way to connect minority communities
with the health care system and to ensure that im-
portant public health messages are received and
understood.86 Churches are another under-
tapped resource in disseminating emergency pre-
paredness information.  Research shows that
African-American ministers and their religious in-
stitutions played a huge role after Hurricane Kat-
rina through: mobilization of resources, providing
services to survivors, brokering relationships be-
tween individuals and the larger disaster response
community, and acting as moral agents and social
justice advocates on behalf of evacuees.87  
Communities that have limited numbers of pro-
ficient English speakers are at a disadvantage
when it comes to preparing for a pandemic.  Not
only does the language difference cause a bar-
rier, but also the cultural differences.  A pilot
program in Seattle, Washington with medical in-
terpreters assessed limited English proficient
communities and found the following:
Medical interpreters found a need for more
disaster preparedness training and education
in order to adequately do their job;
Medical interpreters reported that limited
English-proficient (LEP) communities are not
prepared for disasters; and
Medical interpreters said there is a need for cul-
turally appropriate information and education.
Mistrust of the Health System
Although seasonal influenza vaccinations are
fairly safe and inexpensive, disparities in those
who are vaccinated exist in the United States.
Minority groups have much lower rates of sea-
sonal influenza vaccination compared with
whites.88 In 2004 and 2005, 66 percent to 69 per-
cent of whites were vaccinated compared with
48 percent to 55 percent for Hispanics and only
45 percent to 50 percent for African Americans.
Hispanics and African Americans also have
higher rates of mortality from seasonal influenza
and pneumonia compared with whites. 
Some explanations for disparities in influenza
vaccination include: 
 Barriers to access such as cost, insurance sta-
tus, and language differences;
 Underestimation of personal risk and misun-
derstanding of vaccination risks; and
Mistrust toward the health care system.89
Yet, even after accounting for provider visits, ac-
cess to care, socioeconomic status, health insur-
ance, perceived health, chronic disease, and
demographics, racial/ethnic differences in in-
fluenza vaccinations still exist.90 A study of
Medicare beneficiaries found that African Amer-
icans were significantly less likely than whites to
report positive attitudes toward influenza vacci-
nation.  In order to increase minority vaccina-
tion rates interventions must address negative
beliefs and misinformation.  Individualized, cul-
turally appropriate, evidence-based interven-
tions were found to be effective in increasing
vaccination rates among disadvantaged, racially
diverse, inner-city populations.  Prior to the
health trial only 27.1 percent of participants had
received an influenza vaccination, and at year
four the rate had increased to 48.9 percent.91  
Vaccinations
2. Health Care Workers
Another at-risk segment of society is health care
workers.  In June 2009, CDC reported that 81
U.S. health care workers contracted the H1N1
influenza virus, about half of whom caught it on
the job.92  
Health care workers must take extra care to not
spread the virus to their patients as well as pro-
tect their own health, and one easy way is to get
the seasonal and H1N1 influenza vaccination.  It
may be more of a challenge than expected to en-
courage health care workers to get vaccinated.
For instance, the seasonal flu vaccination rates
have typically been low for health care workers.
According to a study of a group of over 1,000
registered nurses in four states, only 59 percent
reported receiving seasonal influenza vaccine
during the 2005-2006 flu season.93 The most
common reason for not receiving a vaccine was
concern about adverse reactions. Those most
knowledgeable about the vaccination were more
likely to receive a vaccination.
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices
(ACIP) recently released recommendations ad-
vising which populations should be prioritized to
receive H1N1 vaccines in the fall.94 Health care
workers and emergency medical responders can
be found at the top of the list.  The list accounts
for approximately 159 million people -- about half
the population -- yet by mid-October at most only
52 million doses are expected to be available.  In
the case that the supply is not adequate, health
care workers will be bumped from the highest
priority group, but certain eligible health care
workers will still be among the first vaccinated.
CDC and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) recently provided guid-
ance for standards to protect health care work-
ers in the case of a pandemic.95 A survey
developed by six trade unions representing
health care workers found that many workplaces
are not ready for pandemic influenza.  More
than one-third of respondents said that their
workplace is at best “slightly ready” to address the
needs of health care workers during a pandemic.
Worker training and communication scored very
poorly.  Less than half of facilities surveyed re-
ported they had been provided training on pan-
demic flu, had been communicated their
employer’s pandemic flu plan, had been taught
how to recognize flu symptoms in themselves, or
had conducted drills of their pandemic flu plan.
Only 33 percent of respondents believed the ma-
jority of their employee members would show up
to work during a pandemic.96
Various studies show that health care workers
may not go to work during a pandemic for fear
of becoming infected.97 A study in 2005 of al-
most 6,500 employees in long-term care facili-
ties and outpatient centers found that less than
two-third of employees reported an ability to go
to work in the case of a severe acute respiratory
syndrome outbreak.98 Another smaller study
found that just barely more than half of em-
ployees of county health departments would re-
port to work during an influenza pandemic.99  
One way to decrease health care worker absen-
teeism during a pandemic is to put measures in
place before the pandemic occurs.  Protective
measures will give employees confidence that
their employer will protect them during a pan-
demic.  Plans to protect employees include: per-
sonal protective equipment, identification and
isolation of infected patients, identification of
health care workers who will provide care for in-
fected cases, worker training, and securing ade-
quate supplies of safety equipment, antiviral
drugs, and vaccine.100 The Institute of Medicine
(IOM) recently issued recommendations for
how to best protect workers when there may not
be adequate supplies, which is particularly of po-
tential concern for N-95 respirator masks.101  
Many health care workers visit their patients at
home.  Approximately 85 percent of the 1.5 mil-
lion home health care workers are low-wage
workers, represented mostly by women and mi-
norities.102 These home health care paraprofes-
sionals provide personal assistance with activities
such as bathing, toileting, and cooking.  The
number of patients cared for at home generally
is three times the number of patients cared for
in hospitals.  Data from a 1997-1999 Current
Population survey found that only half of home
care aides had some form of health insurance.103
During a pandemic, home health care workers
will be very important because many unpaid care
providers may become ill or unable to continue
providing care.  Also, in order to increase the
number of beds available during a surge many
hospitalized patients will be discharged early and
home health care workers will be able to help by
offering their services during a pandemic.  
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3. The Elderly
Currently, there are an estimated 14 million
people aged 65 or older, approximately 80 per-
cent of whom live with some level of disability
according to the 2000 U.S. Census.106  
During seasonal influenza approximately 90 per-
cent of severe and fatal cases occur in people 65
years of age or older, but in the current outbreak,
the elderly are not at the top of the list of vulner-
able populations -- children are 14 times more
likely to be infected than the elderly.107 However,
it is important that the elderly are highly encour-
aged to get the seasonal flu vaccination.
There are also ongoing concerns for vaccinat-
ing and providing treatment for the elderly
when they have limited mobility.  In a public
health emergency, “conditions such as stress, the
lack of food or water, extremes of heat or cold,
and exposure to infection can contribute to the
rapid worsening of a chronic illness that was
under control before the event,” according to
Preventing Chronic Disease.108 In addition to
chronic conditions, older adults may suffer from
impaired mobility or cognitive ability, poor vi-
sion or hearing, and economic limitations.  
Many elderly live in nursing homes or in retire-
ment communities, which are densely populated
communities where infectious diseases can spread
rapidly.  Many facilities provide seasonal flu vac-
cine, but since the elderly are not on the priority
list for H1N1 vaccine, they will not receive the vac-
cine early in season, so institutional care facilities
must work hard to promote non-pharmaceutical
interventions to limit the spread of disease.  In ad-
dition, many elderly have underlying health con-
ditions, which can make them susceptible for
complications when they contract a disease.  
Significant numbers of seniors do not live in in-
stitutionalized care settings, but still often have
limited mobility.  Ensuring care for seniors with
limited mobility and reaching them with vacci-
nations presents a series of challenges.  Public
health departments often include senior out-
reach plans, but these are difficult to implement
in regular times and will be even more difficult
during a widespread outbreak where officials
will be dealing with numerous challenges across
a range of populations. 
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PROVIDING VACCINATIONS AND HEALTH CARE WORKERS
On August 13, 2009 New York adopted a new regulation requiring health care workers in the state to
be vaccinated for both seasonal and H1N1 influenza.104 The regulation affects workers at hospitals, in
home health care agencies and hospice care, but because of a technicality in the language it does not
include nursing homes.  
Until the new regulation, vaccinations for health care workers were only voluntary and fewer than
half of health care workers were getting an annual flu shot.  The regulation requires applicable
workers to get the seasonal flu vaccine as well as the new H1N1 vaccine.  Workers and volunteers
who have any contact with patients will be required to get vaccinated -- including nurses, doctors,
aides, and even nonmedical staff such as food service workers.
Shortly after the New York regulation, Massachusetts enacted a measure that requires hospitals and
clinics to make the H1N1 vaccine available to all workers and certain volunteers.105 Although most
health care settings already have vaccines available, the measure “emphasizes the importance of being
vaccinated to physicians, nurses and other health care workers.”  The Massachusetts Public Health
Council also voted to allow dentists, pharmacists and paramedics to administer flu vaccinations in an
effort to supplement the opportunities for individuals to get vaccinated.
4. Pregnant Women
Observations from H1N1, past pandemics, and
seasonal influenza show that the flu can be more
severe for pregnant women.  
According to a study conducted shortly after the
initial outbreak of H1N1, pregnant women in-
fected with H1N1 were more likely to be hospi-
talized from the flu, and they also had a greater
chance of death.109 The findings come from
data reported between April 15 and May 18,
2009, during which time there were 34 probable
cases of H1N1 in pregnant woman, 11 were ad-
mitted to the hospital and six of the cases re-
sulted in death.110 Pregnant women make up
one percent of the U.S. population, but at the
time of the study they accounted for six percent
of all deaths from H1N1.
The study acknowledges the short time frame
and small pool of subjects, but concludes that,
“Pregnant women might be at increased risk for
complications from pandemic H1N1 virus in-
fection.  These data lend support to the present
recommendation to promptly treat pregnant
women with H1N1 influenza virus infection with
anti-influenza drugs.”111
For years CDC and the American College of Ob-
stetricians and Gynecologists have urged expec-
tant mothers to get the seasonal influenza
vaccine, but less than 15 percent follow the rec-
ommendation.112 Many women are hesitant to
get the vaccine for fear of injury to the fetus.  In
new guidance, CDC recommends that women
exhibiting flu-like symptoms should be immedi-
ately treated with antiviral medications.113  
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
During infectious disease outbreaks, public
health departments serve as the front lines for
identifying, monitoring, and developing strate-
gies for containing outbreaks.  Federal, state, and
local health departments, health care providers,
businesses, schools, and communities around
the country are working tirelessly to prepare for
H1N1 and the seasonal flu this fall and winter.
The investments made over the past several years
to bolster pandemic preparedness in the United
States have led to tremendous improvements in
federal, state, and local response capabilities, in-
cluding greatly enhancing vaccine research and
development and the stockpiling of antiviral
medications.  And the efforts since the spring
H1N1 outbreak, including  $1.9 billion in emer-
gency supplemental funding and an additional
$5.8 billion in contingency funds, have filled in
gaps to support vaccine production, upgrading
state and local capabilities, improving surveil-
lance systems, and federal preparedness.   
Gaps remain, however, in some critical areas.
Health officials inherited many legacy problems,
including the need to address surge capacity
and weaknesses in the public health infrastruc-
ture, which hinder their ability to do their jobs
as effectively as possible.  
Many public health preparedness experts believe
the best way to gauge how well communities are
prepared for emergencies is through drills or ex-
ercises.  The H1N1 outbreak provides a real-life
opportunity to assess and learn the strengths and
vulnerabilities of preparedness capabilities all
around the country.  As of now, the H1N1 virus
is considered relatively mild, so while the num-
ber of Americans who could become sick, hospi-
talized, or even die will be significant, it provides
the chance to see how well-prepared communi-
ties are during a more controlled outbreak as op-
posed to a worse-case scenario. 
In addition, federal, state, and local governments
and the health care community have already
learned a great deal from their experiences dur-
ing the Spring H1N1 outbreak.  What the rapid
response to the H1N1 crisis showed is that the
large federal investment in pandemic planning
and stockpiling antiviral medications paid off.  All
50 states and many U.S. cities had developed com-
prehensive pandemic influenza plans over the last
several years.  State and local emergency pre-
paredness planners had exercised these plans and
learned from them, which helped them respond
to the outbreak effectively.  We also saw a willing-
ness on the part of both federal and state public
health officials to adapt their pandemic response
plans based on the real-life situation on the
ground and on the science of the pandemic.  For
example, CDC updated and revised its school clo-
sure guidance as it became apparent that H1N1
was circulating widely in communities and shut-
tering schools and sending school kids home was
having no effect on containment.  Federal and
state officials also were able to provide clear,
straightforward information to the public, which
was essential for allaying fears and building trust.   
At the state and local level, public health depart-
ments and medical systems developed innovative
practices to deal with the H1N1 outbreak, in-
cluding the use of alternate care sites to screen,
sort, diagnose, and treat patients complaining of
flu-like symptoms.  In some cases, these sites were
tents set up outside hospitals, in other cases these
were virtual sites or telephone call numbers,
staffed by trained medical personnel, who could
answer questions and ease the burden on hospi-
tals.  State governments also worked hard to
reach out to vulnerable populations, including
low-income residents and those with limited-Eng-
lish proficiency.  The Los Angeles County Health
Department issued fact sheets in 11 languages.
We also saw local governments rely on volunteer
health care workers to staff some of these alter-
nate care sites and call centers.  Again, these suc-
cesses highlight the importance of the investment
in pandemic and all-hazards preparedness.
The following are recommendations that ad-
dress: some immediate concerns that must be
considered for responding to the current H1N1
season and for a third wave of H1N1 that will
likely emerge next year; and longer term recom-
mendations that will help shore up core public
health systems to better prepare the country for
future emergencies and disease outbreaks.   In-
vestments made in preparing for and responding
to H1N1 will also have long-lasting impact in up-
grading the nation’s public health system.  
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THIS IS NOT ABOUT RAISING ALARMS OR STOKING FEARS, BUT ABOUT BEING PREPARED.
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, HHS SECRETARY114 “ ”
SHORT-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS:
 Refine plans for rapid distribution and ad-
ministration of vaccinations:  H1N1 will pres-
ent the first mass vaccination effort to be
conducted in a short time frame in modern
U.S. history.  States and localities should con-
tinue to revise plans for the most effective
ways to provide vaccinations once they are
available.  Federal, state, and local officials
need to identify if additional resources are
needed to pay for administration of vaccines,
especially if third party payers do not provide
adequate coverage for the insured.    
 Special efforts must be made to reach out to en-
courage young adults, minorities, and other at-
risk groups to get vaccinated:  Health
departments must intensify efforts to encourage
high-risk individuals to get H1N1 vaccinations.
Young adults, pregnant women, and minorities,
in particular, traditionally have low flu vaccina-
tion rates and often do not know where or how
to get vaccinations.  In addition, a significant
percentage of young adults do not have health
insurance, which could deter them from going
to get vaccinations.  Outreach to minority pop-
ulations must reflect culturally-competent com-
munications and be delivered by respected,
trusted, and culturally-competent messengers.
 Vaccination campaigns must continue past the
fall to prepare for a potential third wave out-
break:  The fact that the H1N1 vaccine will
likely not be available to the entire population
in October and that the virus is proving to be
mild so far could mean that efforts are not
made to try to encourage the entire popula-
tion to get vaccinations.  It is likely, however,
that a third wave outbreak of H1N1 will occur,
and it could become more virulent.  Federal,
state, and local health departments should
make plans to encourage all Americans to get
vaccinated even past the height of the fall and
winter outbreak, in case there is a third wave
H1N1 outbreak and to help people build im-
munity for potential future related flu strains. 
 Vaccine tracking systems must be enhanced to
monitor for adverse reactions:  A better system is
needed to track when vaccinations are adminis-
tered.  This is crucial for determining if anyone
is having adverse effects related to the vaccine.
 Payment systems for vaccine administration
must be improved:  While the federal govern-
ment will pay for the purchase and distribu-
tion of vaccines, payment for the
administration of vaccines will be the respon-
sibility of insurance providers, state or local
health officials, or in some cases, it possibly
will become an out-of-pocket cost for individ-
uals.  Clear policies and effective systems must
be established as quickly as possible to ensure
that health departments, health care
providers, clinics, pharmacies, and other or-
ganizations who will be administering the vac-
cines to individuals will receive compensation.  
Medicare and Medicaid should ensure their
policies cover the administration of H1N1
vaccines and out-of-network care for H1N1
related illnesses and to allow providers to
bulk bill for the administration of vaccines
to their beneficiaries through roster billing.
 DOL should communicate with ERISA-gov-
erned health benefit plans offered by pri-
vate employers to encourage them to waive
co-pay requirements for vaccines and out-
of-network restrictions and to provide in-
formation to state and local health
departments to help with their vaccination
campaigns in communities.
 OPM and DOD should work with their con-
tractors to waive co-pay requirements for
vaccines and out-of-network restrictions
and to provide information to state and
health departments to help with their vac-
cination campaigns in communities.
 The Treasury Department and IRS should
remind nonprofit hospitals that immuniza-
tions are a key community benefit, and the
importance of meeting community benefit
standards as part of retaining tax-free sta-
tus.  They should encourage nonprofit hos-
pitals to be an active part of vaccination
campaigns in communities, making their
facilities and staff available to work with
state and local health departments.  
Vaccination Campaigns
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 Replenish and update equipment in the SNS:
In the spring, 25 million N-95 respirator
masks were deployed from the SNS to states,
but this inventory was never restocked, re-
portedly due to lack of dedicated funding.
The current stockpile of 79.7 million N-95s is
considered to be severely lacking according to
a number of experts and now because of high
demand, the product is on back order.  
 States should purchase enough antiviral med-
ications to care for at-risk patients in the im-
mediate term:  CDC has recommended that
antiviral medications be used only for people
with severe cases of H1N1 or for people with
underlying health conditions.  Many states
have purchased their full share of antiviral
medications, however 13 states have purchased
less than half their share of federally-subsidized
antiviral medications for use during a pan-
demic outbreak.   States that have not pur-
chased significant shares of their allotment of
antiviral should at least take action to purchase
enough to be able to care for at-risk patients or
patients with severe cases of H1N1.  It is un-
clear how severe the H1N1 virus will prove to
be with high-risk populations this fall and it will
likely re-emerge in a third wave, so states
should be prepared by having enough med-
ications to protect their citizens if needed.
Over the long-term, antiviral purchasing poli-
cies should be updated to make purchasing an-
tiviral, vaccines, and equipment for the SNS a
federal responsibility.  Until that happens,
states should take action to ensure they have
enough medications to protect their citizens.
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Stocking Medical Supplies and Antivirals
 The surveillance recommendations in the
President’s Council of Advisors on Science
and Technology (PCAST) report should be
fully-funded and implemented:  Disease sur-
veillance systems in the United States have
been out-of-date for decades.  Having rapidly
available data that is easily accessible is essen-
tial to allow experts to track the course and
severity of the disease, determine who is most
at risk when, identify when additional antivi-
rals or equipment are needed in a particular
community, detect adverse reactions to the
vaccine, or learn if the disease is becoming re-
sistant to antivirals.  HHS officials have been
working hard to improve systems so they can
monitor the spread of H1N1, and the PCAST
report identifies specific ways to continue to
upgrade H1N1 surveillance systems and capa-
bilities to link systems among hospitals, health
departments, and other health providers, to
compile real-time data.  Enough resources
should be devoted to ensuring these recom-
mendations are carried out as swiftly as possi-
ble, and officials should find ways to leverage
these capabilities and lessons to modernize all
U.S. disease surveillance systems.
Surveillance
 States and localities should follow CDC guid-
ance for school and day care closures:  Com-
munities around the country should follow
the federal guidance on school closures and
find the balance between limiting the spread
of disease and causing social disruption by
closing schools.  
 An emergency health benefit should be es-
tablished:  Congress should establish an emer-
gency health benefit to ensure hospitals and
health care providers can function and get
compensated for providing care for the unin-
sured and underinsured during a public
health emergency, to maintain the solvency of
the healthcare system and ensure all patients
receive needed care.  
 Emergency sick leave should be made avail-
able: The federal government should clarify
whether the Department of Labor’s Disaster
Unemployment Assistance Program would
cover workers without sick leave who self-quar-
antine in the event of a pandemic flu.  Con-
gress should pass legislation that would require
employers with 15 or more employees to offer
a minimum of seven paid sick days each year, to
be used to deal with individual medical needs
or to care for sick family members.  
 Health providers and health departments
should develop and disseminate strong pub-
lic messages about ways to practice good hy-
giene and understand symptoms and
remedies:  Hospitals and health providers
should develop a public messaging system to
give people information about symptoms and
remedies to prevent unnecessary trips to the
emergency room and they should have pan-
demic plans in place to protect employees.
Providing Care in Communities
The following are a series of recommendations
that would help shore up the nation’s core public
health system, which is essential for responding to
future and ongoing health emergencies.  In addi-
tion, as lessons are learned from the H1N1 re-
sponse, these should be used to update federal,
state, and local preparedness planning.  There is
still the threat of the H5N1 “bird” flu circulating
and ongoing concerns about future infectious dis-
ease outbreaks, bioterrorism, and natural disasters. 
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 Disaster Standards of Care:  The IOM re-
cently issued guidance for establishing stan-
dards of care for use in disaster situations.
The guidance is a “preliminary framework”
that describes the key elements that should be
included in disaster standards of care proto-
cols and a template matrix for state and local
health departments for developing specific
guidance for health providers to use when
there is a major influx of patients.  Major dis-
aster standards of care issues include surge ca-
pacity planning for when health providers are
overtaxed, space is limited, and equipment is
scarce and issues of alternate care sites (such
as public arenas or malls), as well as legal and
ethical issues, which should be carefully con-
sidered in advance instead of during the time
of a crisis.  The H1N1 outbreak provides a
mass test of the health care system, however,
because the virus is currently mild, it will allow
for adjustments and modifications, including
learning how to adapt the system for more se-
vere emergencies.  
 Regional Coordination:  Hospitals, local health
departments, and emergency management
agencies should work to establish more regional
consortiums to organize and plan for public
health emergencies.  Such regional collabora-
tion can lead to more efficient use of resources
among hospitals and health departments, in-
cluding personnel, and facilitate the sharing of
promising practices.  This should include all fed-
eral resources active in each region.
 Surge Workforce:  Hospitals, health care
providers, and public health departments
should redouble efforts to recruit additional
medically-trained staff for times of emergency.
This includes creating incentive systems for
employees to work overtime and to find
trained volunteers who can be screened and
would be ready and reachable during times of
emergency.  Issues of liability protection must
also be addressed.  Many volunteers and pri-
vate entities have expressed reluctance to par-
ticipate in emergency health response efforts
due to concerns about liability.  A number of
states have passed legislation to protect vol-
unteer health professionals.  The federal gov-
ernment could also take measures to extend
liability protections if Congress amended the
Public Health Service Act to provide Federal
Tort Claims Act protection to qualified health
professionals when they are activated during
emergencies, and Congress could also con-
Surge Capacity
LONG-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS:
 Federal, state, and local health departments
should share lessons, innovations, and re-
sources:  Better systems should be developed for
real-time sharing of approaches and innovations
across different states, communities, and juris-
dictions.  In addition, neighboring communities
should share and coordinate to the extent pos-
sible plans for policies for providing care and in-
formation, and if necessary, resources.  
HHS and DHS should institute a policy that no
one who contracts H1N1 should be denied care:
HHS and DHS should issue a joint statement
outlining a policy that undocumented individu-
als who receive care for H1N1 will not be sub-
ject to enforcement action in order to ensure
that people who are sick will seek care, which
helps prevent the spread of the disease and also
limits emergency room visits by patients who
delay seeking care until they are severely sick.
 The federal government should lift restric-
tions to allow states to reassign employees
supported by federal funds to be able to
help with the H1N1 response:  Federal
waivers should be granted to release federal
categorically funded program staff to assist
with response at the discretion of local
health officials.
 Health care personnel should follow the guid-
ance from HHS and OSHA on the best way to
protect health care personnel:  Given there is
likely going to be a shortage of N-95 respirator
masks in many communities, officials should
clearly communicate guidance to health fa-
cilities on the best way to allocate personal
protective equipment and reduce the need
for respirators among health care workers.
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sider a minimum protection to address liabil-
ity issues for businesses and non-profit organ-
izations who work with government officials
responding to emergencies.
 Hospital Plans:  Hospitals and health care
providers must have clear and practiced plans
in place to respond to emergencies or a major
influx of patients.  Planning must include how
to provide continued care for daily emergen-
cies and chronic care during emergencies,
separating infectious patients from others in
intake and emergency departments, and dis-
couraging the “worried well” from over-
crowding emergency rooms.  
 A fully-funded and reliable funding stream is
needed to support public health prepared-
ness:  Public health infrastructure has been
underfunded for decades, according to as-
sessments from CDC, IOM, and other experts.
Federal funding for core state public health
preparedness was cut 25 percent between FY
2005 and 2009.  It is important that states have
a reliable, dedicated, and sustained level of
funding that is adequate to meet core capa-
bilities and to continue to keep pace with new
technologies that can help them better meet
the needs of communities.  Congress should
assure a robust, reliable funding stream
through health reform legislation for all core
public health activities.
 A mechanism should be created to ensure that
vaccines, medications, and equipment in the
SNS are replenished and upgraded as needed:
Right now, there is no systematic way to en-
sure that new supplies are purchased to re-
place used items so the country will be
prepared for the next emergency.  After the
H1N1 outbreak, it will also be essential that
the SNS and states replenish the supply of an-
tiviral medications to prepare for the poten-
tial threat of future outbreaks.
 All U.S. disease surveillance systems must be
modernized:  The nation’s disease surveil-
lance and health tracking systems are severely
out-of-date and do not provide real-time or
easily accessible data.  The upgrades to sur-
veillance during the H1N1 should be used to
leverage upgrading the rest of U.S. disease
surveillance capabilities.  The nationwide im-
plementation of health information technol-
ogy systems through the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act and health reform pro-
posals must take into account the need for
public health data accessibility.
 Additional core public health infrastructure
capabilities must be modernized:  There is no
system in place to ensure that the basic public
health systems and equipment keep pace with
advances in science and technology.  There
needs to be a systematic way to ensure that the
technology and equipment that support core
functions, like laboratory testing and com-
munications, are routinely updated.  
 Pandemic plans must be continually revised:
As the emergence of H1N1 demonstrated,
new strains of flu can emerge quickly and rap-
idly.  In addition, experts are still concerned
that the H5N1 “bird” flu could potentially be-
come a human pandemic.  It is essential that
the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza
and state plans be continually revised.  Plans
should particularly be updated to incorporate
the lessons learned during the H1N1 out-
break and response. 
Fund and Modernize Core Public Health
MAJOR FLU OUTBREAKS OF THE 20TH CENTURY115
1918 -- The “Spanish” flu pandemic killed 500,000 in the United States, 50 million worldwide. 
1957-58 -- An outbreak spread from China across the globe, killing approximately 70,000 in the
United States.  In April 2005, a company testing laboratory proficiency mistakenly distributed samples
of this pandemic strain to laboratories worldwide, triggering worldwide concern until all samples
were accounted for and destroyed.116
1968-69 – The “Hong Kong” flu, the most recent pandemic, affected millions worldwide and dis-
rupted world economies.  
1997 – The first identification of the avian “bird” flu H5N1, which remains active in Asia.117
2009 – As of August 13, 2009, the H1N1 virus was reported in over 175 countries, with nearly 5,000
hospitalizations and more than 475 deaths in the United States.
APPENDIX A:  METHODOLOGY FOR SEASONAL FLU
VACCINATIONS
Data for this analysis was obtained from the Be-
havioral Risk Factor Surveillance System
(BRFSS) dataset (publicly available on the web
at cdc.gov/brfss).118 To conduct the analyses,
TFAH contracted with Edward N. Okeke, MBBS,
MPH at the Department of Health Management
and Policy at the University of Michigan School
of Public Health.  The variable of interest was the
FLUSHOT variable.119 Researchers weighted
data from 2008 using sample weights provided
by the CDC in the dataset and dropped observa-
tions where either the survey participant an-
swered, “don’t know” or refused to answer. These
accounted for less than 0.5 percent of all obser-
vations. Researchers then calculated flu vaccina-
tion rates for three different population samples
– individuals aged 18-49, individuals aged 50-64,
and individuals 65 and older – for each state.
The research team reported 2008 flu vaccination
rates for each sub-sample, along with standard
errors and 95 percent confidence intervals. Re-
spective sample sizes for each sub-sample were
151,903, 130,713, and 121,459.  
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APPENDIX B:  POTENTIAL PANDEMIC INFLUENZA
CASES, HOSPITALIZATIONS AND BED CAPACITY
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Potential Pandemic Influenza Cases, Hospitalizations and Bed Capacity
Pandemic at a 15% Attack Rate Pandemic at a 25% Attack Rate
State Cases Hospital Bed Capacity Cases Hospital Bed Capacity 
Admissions at Week 5 Admissions at Week 5
Alabama 689,855 9,654 23% 1,149,758 16,089 39%
Alaska 100,508 1,220 25% 167,513 2,034 41%
Arizona 924,948 12,584 50% 1,541,580 20,973 84%
Arkansas 421,631 5,931 22% 702,718 9,885 36%
California 5,468,632 72,011 54% 9,114,387 120,018 89%
Colorado 713,007 9,397 38% 1,188,344 15,662 63%
Connecticut 525,721 7,416 63% 876,202 15,430 132%
Delaware 128,021 1,799 87% 213,369 2,998 145%
D.C. 87,230 1,244 20% 145,383 2,074 33%
Florida 2,713,483 40,742 34% 4,522,472 67,903 57%
Georgia 1,404,591 18,149 33% 2,340,985 30,249 56%
Hawaii 192,825 2,747 61% 321,375 4,579 102%
Idaho 219,970 2,915 28% 366,616 4,859 47%
Illinois 1,924,796 26,114 31% 3,207,993 43,524 52%
Indiana 947,028 12,957 24% 1,578,380 21,595 41%
Iowa 447,313 6,408 22% 745,521 10,679 36%
Kansas 414,611 5,713 18% 691,019 9,522 31%
Kentucky 630,911 8,775 22% 1,051,519 14,625 37%
Louisiana 643,165 8,735 20% 1,071,942 14,558 34%
Maine 198,236 2,898 36% 330,394 4,830 59%
Maryland 842,359 11,439 61% 1,403,932 19,065 102%
Massachusetts 965,579 13,689 47% 1,609,298 22,816 79%
Michigan 1,514,346 20,822 34% 2,523,911 34,703 56%
Minnesota 775,065 10,615 29% 1,291,775 17,691 48%
Mississippi 436,581 5,919 15% 727,635 9,864 25%
Missouri 876,407 12,252 26% 1,460,678 20,419 43%
Montana 141,695 2,017 21% 236,158 3,361 34%
Nebraska 265,250 3,675 19% 442,083 6,126 31%
Nevada 374,329 4,988 59% 623,882 8,314 98%
New Hampshire 197,234 2,751 36% 328,724 4,585 60%
New Jersey 1,308,684 18,219 43% 2,181,140 30,365 72%
New Mexico 293,190 3,974 40% 488,650 6,624 66%
New York 2,895,927 40,603 46% 4,826,546 67,671 77%
North Carolina 1,328,476 18,199 41% 2,214,126 30,331 68%
North Dakota 95,380 1,378 14% 158,967 2,296 23%
Ohio 1,721,701 24,098 30% 2,869,502 40,163 50%
Oklahoma 536,882 7,446 24% 894,803 12,410 41%
Oregon 555,114 7,781 46% 925,190 12,968 76%
Pennsylvania 1,866,093 27,245 33% 3,110,155 45,409 55%
Rhode Island 160,142 2,296 61% 266,903 3,827 102%
South Carolina 648,187 8,997 40% 1,080,312 14,995 66%
South Dakota 117,288 1,655 16% 195,480 2,758 26%
Tennessee 905,820 12,577 26% 1,509,701 20,962 43%
Texas 3,526,167 45,123 28% 5,876,946 75,205 47%
Utah 382,509 4,645 36% 637,516 7,742 59%
Vermont 93,586 1,339 46% 155,977 2,232 77%
Virginia 1,146,433 15,656 43% 1,910,721 26,093 72%
Washington 959,370 13,060 46% 1,598,950 21,767 76%
West Virginia 272,771 4,030 21% 454,618 6,717 34%
Wisconsin 833,476 11,655 32% 1,389,127 19,426 53%
Wyoming 77,251 1,065 17% 128,751 1,775 28%
*Based on the CDC’s FluSurge model program.  Estimates rely on FluSurge 2.0 Beta Test Software, created by the CDC.
More information about the model is available at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/flusurge.htm.   
This scenario examines what would happen during a mild pandemic outbreak.  The severity for this type of outbreak is based on the
1968 flu pandemic, which is considered relatively mild.  The factors in the FluSurge model are set to assumptions based on the 1968
pandemic.  These default settings assume an outbreak would be 8 weeks in duration and 35 percent of the population would become
ill.  The data for the age demograhics are from the Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey, 2006, available at
http://www.census.gov/.  The bed statistics are based on the total number of licensed 2006 hospital beds (B) (which is available
through Kaiser Family Foundation’s State Health Facts, available at http://www.statehealthfacts.org/cgi-bin/healthfacts.cgi) and the
typical hospital bed occupancy rates (R) (available for 2006 from CDC data and are available in the chart book, Health, United States,
2008).  To determine the usual number of usual available beds, TFAH used the following formula – ((StatePop/1000) * B) x (1-R).
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